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In today’s economy, an ever-increasing number of companies are dealing with 
partners from across the world giving rise to the need to understand the impact of 
cultural differences on business interactions. This dissertation uses two different 
approaches to investigate the impact of culture in buyer supplier relationships. The 
first study researches the effect of cultural differences in contractual buyer-supplier 
agreements using transaction cost as a theoretic lens. A large number of relationships 
translate into contracts between partners, but very few studies have investigated the 
effect of cultural differences on these written agreements: This research looks at the 
level of contract completeness and the option to renegotiate the contract as outcome 
variables. The study investigates the impact of cultural difference in buyer-supplier 
relationships using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The main finding is that contract 
completeness increases as the cultural gap between the buyer and supplier widens. 
The results for individual culture dimensions on contract completeness are mixed. 
  
Cultural distance impacts the option of renegotiation but the individual dimensions 
fail to have an effect. Finally, asset specificity has the expected positive effect on the 
level of contract completeness and the option to renegotiate, while more frequent 
transactions result in lower levels of contract completeness and fewer options to 
renegotiate. Overall, these findings emphasize that cultural background is a factor in 
contractual buyer supplier relationships and need to be taken into account in global 
supply chain management. 
The second essay investigates the impact of cultural differences in the context of 
dyadic buyer-supplier negotiations. It looks at the moderating effect of culture. The 
study uses an experimental design to investigate these issues. In the simulation 
negotiation, participants, classified by their country of origin, are asked to take on the 
role of either a buyer or a seller. They negotiate prices and quality levels for three 
products. This study finds that cultural differences within the negotiation dyad reduce 
joint profits when compared to dyads of participants with similar cultural 
backgrounds. Cultural differences weaken the effect of trust and opportunism on joint 
profits. Overall, this study concludes that cultural differences as encountered in day-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Global sourcing has increased tremendously over the past decades due to reduced 
trade barriers and increased information and communication technologies (Kaufmann & 
Carter, 2002). Today, the U.S. economy and a majority of U.S. businesses, are heavily 
dependent on imports. U.S. imports in the past five years alone have increased by 55% 
from $1.26 trillion in 2003 to $1.95 trillion in 2007 (Census, 2008). Almost two-thirds of 
these imports were industrial supplies or capital goods such as “computers, 
telecommunications equipment, motor vehicle parts, office machines, electric power 
machinery” (Factbook, 2008). Similarly, in 2007, the U.S. economy exported goods 
worth $1.16 trillion (Census, 2008). More than 75% of these exports were industrial 
supplies or capital goods such as “transistors, aircraft, motor vehicle parts, computers, 
telecommunications equipment” (Factbook, 2008). Given this strong reliance on foreign 
goods and the resulting need for international negotiations, it is surprising that there is 
limited research on international buyer-supplier relationships (Kaufmann & Carter, 
2002).  
This research examines the impact of culture on buyer-supplier relationships from 
two different perspectives. The first study investigates the impact of culture on 
contractual buyer-supplier relationships for a multinational company. Williamson’s 
(1979) transaction cost economics is used as a theoretical lens to motivate the study, 
while Hofstede’s (1983b) cultural dimensions are used to operationalize culture and 
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cultural distance. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to 
investigate the impact of culture using written contracts. The second study focuses on the 
impact of culture on a buyer-supplier dyad negotiation simulation. Culture is 
operationalized using Hall’s (1976) low versus high context culture distinction. This 
research contributes twofold to the growing field of research investigating culture in 
negotiations: First, special focus in this research is on the impact of culture on perceived 
level of opportunism and actual opportunistic behavior. Second, the study investigates the 
moderating effect of culture on a variety of dimensions of negotiation. 
Both papers are aimed at providing insights for companies with regard to their 
international supply chains. In today’s global economy, firms are required to interact and 
negotiate with parties from around the world. Hence, the issues explored here are 
applicable to a vast number of businesses. Better understanding the influences of culture 
on the dealings of buyers and suppliers will enable companies to avoid costly 
misunderstanding and pitfalls.  
This section continues with a short literature overview regarding culture, 
providing a definition for the concept as well as two widely accepted operationalizations 
of culture in the literature. The chapter concludes with a short section that wraps up the 
overall idea of culture and a short lay-out of the rest of this dissertation.  
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1.2 Literature Sketch 
1.2.1 Culture 
“Culture is the collective programming of the human mind that distinguishes the 
members of one human group from those of another” (Hofstede, 1980)  
Culture allows outsiders to identify members of a group as belonging together as 
well as allowing its members to share values, beliefs, and traits; they can identify 
themselves with a collective (Hall, 1976). Culture provides guidelines as to how things 
should be and affects its members’ behavior (Hofstede, 1985). Generally speaking, and 
from early research in modern organizations, most viewpoints start by using personal 
background as a benchmark, hence resulting in very different interpretation of the same 
situation in different cultures. As demonstrated by Hofstede (1980), the debate that arose 
between leading authorities in this field in the early 20th century was partially due to 
authors’ nationality and hence their own cultural embeddedness. In the 1960s marketing 
literature, several authors discussed the impact of culture on customers and their 
perspectives, resulting in the adjustment of product marketing and advertising to these 
needs.  
Although the impact of culture on various aspects of business life has been 
investigated, the literature is relatively scarce on the impact of culture on the relationship 
between organizations (Kaufmann & Carter, 2006). Today’s supply chains generally span 
more countries than a decade or two ago. Companies source and produce across the globe 
(Griffith, Myers, & Harvey, 2006), a development that is substantially facilitated by IT as 
   
 4 
it eases instantaneous communication between partners. However, this also implies that 
the management of companies has to deal with a more diverse employee and customer 
base resulting in potential conflicts.  
Culture impacts organizational philosophy. So, if different cultures impact 
organizations differently, how do organizations take these differences into account when 
interacting with each other and when negotiating contracts? Two leading theorists in 
distinguishing cultural differences are Geert Hofstede and Edward Hoff. In the following, 
both are discussed in more detail. 
1.2.2 Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions  
Hofestede developed a measure for culture widely used in the academic literature 
(i.e., Graham, Mintu, & Rodgers, 1994). During the 1960s, he conducted a research in 
which he approached more than 40,000 IBM employees and asked them to participate in 
the study. Based on his findings, he developed Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions to 
differentiate subjects from different countries. The dimensions are power distance (PDI), 
masculinity/feminity (MAS), individualism/collectivism (IDV) and uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI). Figure 1 provides a comparison between the United States of America 
and China on these five dimensions.  
Power distance refers to the extent to which unequal division of power is accepted 
within a society. Masculinity refers to a focus on values such as competitiveness, 
assertiveness, ambition, and the accumulation of wealth and material possessions, as 
opposed to femininity, which refers to values of relationships and quality of life. 
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Individualism versus collectivism refers to whether members of a society would rather 
act in reference for themselves (individual) or a group (collectivism). Uncertainty 
avoidance reflects societies’ needs for rules and regulations in order to avoid anxiety due 
to uncertainty.  
  
Figure 1: Cultural dimensions of China and the U.S.A.  
The most accepted implementation of the Hofstede dimensions is the composite 
index for cultural distance (CDI) derived by Kogut and Singh (1998). In their study, in 
which they employ the index, Kaufman and Carter (2006) confirm that research in the 
field of international supply chain management for manufacturing companies is relatively 
scarce. They investigate the antecedents of supply management performance of 
international buyer-supplier relationships from the buyer’s perspective. The authors 
surveyed both German and U.S. manufacturing companies. According to the authors’ 
model, cultural distance is part of the broader measure of uncertainty. As such, it 
significantly, negatively impacts social bonding in their U.S. subset, hence, providing the 
link to previous studies that assess the importance of socialization (Cousins & Menguc, 
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2006) and alignment of partners (Barnes, Naude, & Michell, 2007). Interestingly, in their 
German subset, this relationship is insignificant. According to an interviewed German 
manager, this result is due to the fact that internationalization is less of an issue. 
However, as this path is significant in the U.S. model, national diversity is present and, 
hence, is likely to be reflected differently in various, perhaps culturally determined, 
management styles. According to the authors, these results might reflect the level of 
exposure to international suppliers.  
Chung, Sternquist and Chen (2006) look at the impact of the Japanese culture on 
the retailer-buyer relationship. The authors surveyed department stores in Japan and 
found that in this cultural setting long-term orientation is an antecedent of trust and 
dependence, resulting in expectations and obligations towards the partner firms. This 
implies a considerably different mind-set to business dealings in the U.S.A. or Europe. 
Hence, companies from these continents willing to conduct business in Japan either need 
to adjust/align their goals with that of their partners in order to succeed or vice versa.  
Bianchi (2006) develops a survey based on CDI to investigate this problem in 
more detail. Her study focuses on the impact of cultural differences on the development 
of trust and commitment but fails to find significant results. The unit of analysis is 
Chilean importers and their last foreign transaction. This leads to the major drawback of 
the study as the author has no opportunity to create a dyadic analysis nor is she able to 
compare trust levels between domestic versus global suppliers.  
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1.2.3 Hall’s High versus Low Context Culture 
Hall (1976) distinguished between low- and high-context cultures. The former 
relies on direct/explicit (often verbal) communication: Messages are communicated 
directly. High context on the other hand rely on the context the message is communicated 
in to provide the full meaning of the message. Context variables can include among 
others “individual backgrounds, associations, values and position in society” (Mintu-
Wimsatt & Gassenheimer, 2000), “physical environment, status/power relationships, 
roles of participants, and even the nonverbal aspects of communication” (Graham et al., 
1994, p. 77). High context culture relates back to relationship building in what Hofstede 
defines as collective cultures (e.g. Asian cultures). Low context cultures are in line with 
Hofstede’s individualistic cultures (e.g. USA, Western Europe). 
Ueltschy, Ueltschy and Fachinelli (2007) explore the impact of culture on trust in 
international supply chains using the concepts of Hall (1976) to distinguish between high 
(Brazil) and low-context (U.S.A.) cultures. They surveyed manufacturers in the U.S.A. 
and distributors in Brazil and found that the concept of trust (scale adjusted from Morgan 
& Hunt, 1994) differed significantly between the two countries. Overall, the authors 
conclude that as companies expand abroad there arises the need to better understand the 
“often subtle cultural differences” (p.22) in order to achieve good working relationships 
between partners. 
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1.3 Summary 
 This chapter provides an introduction to the subject of culture and its impact on 
business. Both Hofestede’s and Hall’s cultural distinctions are elaborated upon to give a 
basic understanding of their concepts. They are the bases of the majority of studies that 
address issues related to international interactions between partners. Next, I provide a 
brief review of different cross-cultural studies in the field of buyer supplier relationship. 
Although some preliminary work exists, the findings are scarce and not (always) 
consistent with expectations. The majority of these studies stress the need for further 
analysis in the field of cultural differences in buyer-supplier relationship to get a better 
understanding of the impact of culture in business relations. Hence, this dissertation aims 
at providing new and more detailed insights into two distinct aspects of intercultural 
interactions in global supply chains: contractual interactions and verbal negotiations.  
In the following, both essays are explained in more detail. Chapter 2 introduces 
the research study that investigates the impact of culture on contracts. It discusses the 
research questions and related literature, followed by the hypotheses development. In the 
methodology section, I provide an overview of the data. This chapter concludes with a 
short results section, followed by the discussion of the results and an overall conclusion. 
Chapter 3 discusses the second study, starting with the impact of culture in negotiations. 
It provides theoretical background on negotiations and culture in negotiations followed 
by the hypotheses section for this study. In the methodology section, the experiment is 
explained. Next, the data collected is described before addressing the hypotheses. In the 
subsequent section, the results are discussed in detail. Finally, this chapter gives a brief 
   
 9 
conclusion of the main findings. The dissertation concludes with a chapter that 
summarizes the findings of both studies and that provides an overall conclusion. The final 
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Chapter 2: The Impact of Culture on Contractual Buyer-Supplier 
Relationships 
 
2. 1 Introduction 
More than 25 years ago, Hofstede (1983b) developed cultural dimensions that 
reflect national differences in the way people interact. In order to successfully deal with 
people from different countries and cultural backgrounds, it is important to understand 
these differences and how they impact the interactions of the involved parties. However, 
few studies have applied Hofestede’s cultural dimensions to contracting in buyer-supplier 
relationships. Although some studies discuss its influence and impact on global oral 
negotiations (Brett, 2007), none, to this researcher’s knowledge, has derived any 
recommendations for businesses how cultural differences impact the written 
communication and contracting between partners in a supply chain. In an environment 
that is embracing global supply chains, a better understanding of the impact of cultural 
differences is of the essence in order to achieve viable and competitive relationships. A 
better understanding of the impacts of culture on buyer supplier relationship can help 
organizations improve their understanding of the dynamics of these relationships 
ultimately translating in more nuanced deals with fewer problems. Hence, there is a need 
to understand the impact of culture better in order to take cultural differences into account 
when communicating in an international context.  
Therefore, the study at hand addresses the following research question: 
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What is the effect of differences in the cultural background of buyer and supplier 
on their contractual relations? 
First, the study provides unique insights into the negotiation outcomes of an 
organization by using archival data drawn from a European multinational Global Fortune 
500 company. Previous studies have focused on survey based methodology (Kaufmann & 
Carter, 2006) or negotiation simulations (Brett, 2000; Graham et al., 1994) when 
investigating the impact of culture. Therefore, the use of archival data provides an 
additional dimension to the existing debate of understanding the impact culture can and 
should have in international buyer-supplier relationships. Second, the majority of these 
studies has focused on just a certain type of relationship, namely joint ventures (Lu, 
2006) or mergers and acquisitions (Morisini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). However, these are 
very specific forms of relationships and the findings of these studies do not necessarily 
apply to buyer-supplier relationships in a more traditional sense, the purchase and sale of 
goods and services between firms. The current study therefore contributes to the literature 
by providing insights into the impact of culture on actual day-to-day buyer-supplier 
relationships. Third, the study at hand applies a formal transaction cost economics lens to 
the issue of culture and cultural distance. Using a theoretical framework provides 
structure and grounding to the topic.  
The current chapter proceeds as follows: In the next section, an overview of 
transaction cost economics as a framework for the study is provided. I introduce and 
define the notion of culture, along with a more detailed descriptions of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions. The second section discusses culture and its relationship with TCE. 
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In the third section, hypotheses are derived using transaction cost economics framework. 
The fourth section lists the data collection process, along with a detailed description of 
the variables employed in the study. In the fifth section, the results are detailed. A 
discussion of the results follows along with robustness checks, limitations and future 
directions for research in section six and I conclude with section seven. 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
2.2.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
The current study uses Williamson’s (1975) transaction cost economics (TCE) as 
an overarching theory. Transaction cost economics refers to “the costs of using the 
market to conduct business” (Waldman & Jensen, 2007, p. 19). A firm’s overall objective 
is to minimize the costs that govern the relationship between buyer and supplier 
(transaction costs) when conducting business in order to maximize profits and 
shareholder value. Williamson (1981) emphasized that there are several advantages to 
procuring products rather than producing them in-house. The market, in certain 
situations, can capture economies of scale and scope that are unavailable to a company in 
need of only a few products. Also, using the market provides a mean to mitigate the 
potential risks of fluctuations in demand from the company to the market, which can 
more easily pool the risks across various firms.  
Both Coase (1937) and Williamson (1979) specify the costs involved with 
purchasing on the market and describe them as follows: “searching for a supplier, 
negotiating with the supplier about contract terms, arranging for delivery, and monitoring 
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the quality of the input” (Waldman & Jensen, 2007, p.19). The underlying assumption is 
that a firm never has complete information, skills and time. This situation is referred to in 
the literature as bounded rationality (Williamson, 1979, 1981) and is the primary reason 
for incomplete contracts. Companies are unable to foresee every eventuality and, even if 
that were possible, the costs would outweigh the benefits. This opens up the potential for 
opportunism (e.g.  Williamson, 1981): companies – as they are led by individuals – are 
prone to similar behavior pattern as humans (Hill, Eckerd, Wilson, & Greer, 2009) and 
are likely to maximize their own utility irrespective of potential hazards to the other 
party.  
2.2.2 Drivers of Transaction Cost 
According to TCE, three main characteristics determine the level of transaction 
cost: uncertainty, frequency, and idiosyncrasy of investments, or asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1979). Uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of events, contingencies 
and people. The literature has classified uncertainty into two main subgroups (Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Its primary form, also referred 
to as environmental uncertainty, is due to changes in circumstances and the environment 
in the future that cannot be defined in the contract ex ante. The second kind of 
uncertainty, behavioral uncertainty, refers to issues arise due to the inability of the 
involved parties to assess performance ex post. By means of opportunistic decisions, a 
partner in the relationship can choose to deviate from the contractual agreement, 
especially if the other partner has no possibility to control performance (Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997).  
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Applying this theoretic lens to the global supply chain, uncertainty is increased 
when buyers and supplier conduct business in an international context in comparison to a 
purely domestic context. Culture impacts norms, values and expectation of the partner 
(Hofstede, 1980). Buyers and sellers in international relationships are dealing with 
partners that differ in their approaches to each other, in how they conduct their day-to-
day operations, in their expectations of each other, and in the situations they are facing 
(Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998). As a company ventures abroad, the environment in 
which it conducts business expands and broadens giving rise to more variations. 
Predicting future outcomes in a country that is unfamiliar in culture, norms and values is 
likely to amplify environmental uncertainty effects. Similarly, these cultural norms and 
values can likely translate to different views on issues such as opportunistic behavior, 
relationship development and mutual understanding in negotiations, thus increasing 
behavioral uncertainty.   
Asset specificity, or idiosyncratic investment, refers to the degree one partner 
makes specific assets available and/or investments towards the transaction that cannot 
easily be transferred to another relationship (Geyskens et al., 2006). Asset specificity can 
take on the forms of a specific geographic location, physical characteristics of machinery, 
or specialized human capital. Generally, highly specialized assets are costly. In addition, 
the more specific an asset, the lower its transferability, and, hence, the higher the 
interdependency of the involved parties (Williamson, 1993). According to transaction 
cost economics, asset specificity leads companies to internalize production in order to 
reduce (eliminate) the transaction costs that arise due to complicated and lengthy contract 
negotiations (Williamson, 1979).   
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Finally, transaction frequency refers to the recurrence of transactions. Williamson 
(1985a) argues that as the number of transaction increases, companies are more inclined 
to internalize these often procured products as they are now more easily able to develop 
economies of scale. Although this dimension is indispensable to the classification of 
governance forms (please see next paragraph), it has received the least attention in the 
literature of the three TCE characteristics (Geyskens et al., 2006; Rindfleisch & Heide, 
1997).   
2.2.3 Governance Forms in TCE  
According to TCE, a continuum of transaction governance exists that evolves 
from market to hybrid to hierarchy. Market governance is based on classical contract law 
and assumes that the structure is non-transaction-specific (Williamson, 1979). This 
implies that the transaction does not require specific information to be exchanged 
between the involved parties and applies to goods that are procured both on an occasional 
and frequent basis. The transaction generally involves “standardized goods at equilibrium 
prices” (Williamson, 1979, p. 247f) in which both buyers and suppliers are exchangeable 
and anonymous (autonomous contractors) (Geyskens et al., 2006); hence, no 
interdependency arises. In the case of frequent purchases, the partners can rely on their 
personal experience to decide whether to continue to interact with a particular partner or 
whether to find an alternative source to conduct business at little or no additional cost to 
the companies involved (Carter & Hodgson, 2006). In case of occasional transactions, the 
parties can rely on word-of-mouth in the market. Both formal and informal controls in the 
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market generally provide sufficient incentives to behave responsibly. The market 
provides sufficient controls and, hence, governs the transactions (Williamson, 1979). 
The hybrid governance form is based on neoclassical contract law and assumes a 
non-trivial dependency between the involved parties. The governance structure is 
considered to refer to transactions in which the identity of the involved parties matter. 
This form is mainly used in the context of “occasional transactions of the mixed and 
highly idiosyncratic kinds” (Williamson, 1979, p. 249). Partners that engage in this kind 
of a market governance structure are to some extent dependent on each other and inclined 
to finish each interaction as agreed upon.  
Both parties invest time, effort and, occasionally, idiosyncratic investments into 
the relationship resulting in the need for a contract. Generally, some asset specific 
investments are in place that would lose value if transferred to another party; the higher 
this investment the greater the incentives for the involved parties to continue the 
relationship. Frequency of transaction also influences this governance form, as the 
specific investments require a certain number of transactions to recover the cost. If 
disagreements arise, parties in this set-up are likely to resort to dispute arbitration by, if 
needed, third parties (Williamson, 1979). The hybrid option is more flexible and to some 
extent forgiving than the market governance structure: “This governance form foresees 
unanticipated disturbances, provides a ‘tolerance zone’ within which misalignments are 
absorbed, requires information disclosure when adaptation occurs” (David & Han, 2004, 
p. 40).  In this context, formal contractual arrangements are needed as the market does 
not provide adequate controls to restrict opportunistic behavior (Carter & Hodgson, 
2006). Most interactions that are referred to as buyer-supplier relationships in the 
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literature fall into this category as they often involve repeated, non-trivial interactions 
with a specific supplier.  
Hierarchy, the third classification in the governance structure, is appropriate when 
the transactions are highly specific and frequent, and based on contract law of 
forbearance (David & Han, 2004; Williamson, 1979). Although Williamson (1979) 
specified both obligational contracting (high asset specificity, little possibility to reap 
economies of scale, hence, leaving production to an outside company) and internal 
organization (high asset specificity, hence, internalization of production) as individual 
sub-sections of hierarchy, the majority of studies focuses on the latter (i.e., Geyskens et 
al., 2006).  
The obligational contracting or bilateral governance structure is characterized by 
high asset specificity and hence a great, mutual dependency between the two parties. The 
idiosyncratic investment is unlikely to be used in alternative production. Therefore, it 
binds both parties to each other providing incentives for both to remain in the relationship 
rather than break it. Hence, the parties are required to adapt to changing environments 
and circumstances. Contracting in this context is focused on long-term arrangements 
(Carter & Hodgson, 2006). 
The internal organization or unified governance structure is the other extreme 
with respect to the market structure. The firm chooses not to buy from the outside and 
rather produces in-house as the transactions become more idiosyncratic and more 
frequent. As the company vertically integrates, “the need to consult, complete, or revise 
interfirm agreements” (Williamson, 1979, p. 253) becomes superfluous.  
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2.2.4 Contracts in Empirical Research 
Contracts are a means to manifest negotiations in written form and, thereby, 
provide a safety net for the involved parties and a reference in terms of expectations and 
requirements. In the current study, contracts refer to written agreements between a buyer 
and a seller. Contracts are the final link between parties involved in an exchange before 
the actual exchange of the goods and/or services. They are the written version of the 
terms and conditions determined during negotiation. However, in the majority of cases, 
contracts contain (partially) confidential information and, as such, companies are very 
reluctant to provide insights into their dealings with their buyers and suppliers. Hence, 
research that involves actual contracts in a business context is relatively scarce.  
A variety of studies have investigated the effect of transaction costs in the context 
of contracting. The concept of transaction cost refers to costs a company incurs when 
conducting a transaction. The company generally has the choice between procuring a 
product on the market (buy) versus producing it in-house (make). According to Coase 
(1937), companies would weigh the involved costs and choose to undertake the 
transaction internally as long as the costs were lower or equal to the costs of sourcing the 
product on the market.  
Joskow (1987) wrote a seminal article in which he investigates the impact of 
relationship-specific investments on contract duration applying transaction cost theory to 
position his study. The author states three kinds of asset specificity that apply in the 
context of coal supplies: site specificity (e.g. build a plant next to the mine), physical 
asset specificity (equipment and machinery investments), and dedicated assets (general 
investments that might lead to excess capacity/loss of needed materials if contract ends 
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prematurely). To empirically confirm his hypotheses, data on contracts from the coal 
suppliers in England for the year 1979 were used. Joskow finds that buyers and suppliers 
agree to longer contracts if specific investments need to be made. 
Another paper that provides insights into the contractual relationship between 
buyer and supplier is Saussier (2000). The author investigates the relationship between 
contract completeness and the transaction cost characteristics of asset specificity and 
uncertainty. Saussier (2000) argues that as the level of contract completeness is in part 
defined by bounded rationality, the involved parties can only negotiate the content of a 
contract to a certain extent. Beyond that point, the costs of defining the contract outweigh 
the potential costs of an incomplete contract. The author finds support for the proposition 
of transaction cost analysis that “the marginal costs of a contract that aims for 
completeness increases with the transaction-uncertainty level and the contract-
completeness level” (Saussier, 2000, p. 193). 
2.2.5 Culture  
Culture has been defined in the literature as the “collective programming of the 
mind” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 4). Culture allows outsiders to identify members of a group as 
belonging together. Its members share values, beliefs, and traits; they can identify 
themselves with a collective (Hall 1976). Culture provides guidelines as to how things 
should be and affects its members’ behavior (Hofstede, 1985). It enables people to 
function within a group by providing guidelines to life, interpretations to actions and 
situations (Hall, 1976). To a great extent, cultural groups are defined by national borders 
as values, lifestyles and various other perceptions (e.g. ethical behavior or service 
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quality) are determined within these geographic dimensions (Sun, Horn, & Merritt, 2004; 
Ueltschy et al., 2007). For the current study, culture refers to national culture and is a 
combination of beliefs, values and customs that form societal behavioral norms and 
expectations (Ueltschy et al., 2007) defined by both verbal and nonverbal 
communication.  
Although the impact of culture on various aspects of business life has been 
investigated, the literature is relatively scarce on the impact of culture on the relationship 
between organizations (Kaufmann & Carter, 2006). Today’s supply chains generally span 
more countries than a decade or two ago. Companies source and produce across the globe 
(Griffith et al., 2006), a development that is substantially facilitated by information 
technology as it eases instantaneous communication between partners. However, this also 
implies that the management of companies has to deal with a more diverse employee and 
customer base, resulting in potential conflicts. In the following, the cultural dimensions 
are discussed in more detail. 
2.2.6 Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions  
Hofstede (1980) conducted a study in 40 countries evaluating responses from 
116,000 questionnaires to assess differences of personal perceptions across countries and 
continents. Based on his findings, he developed Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions to 
differentiate subjects from different countries, which since have been widely used in the 
academic literature (Graham et al., 1994). The dimensions are power distance index 
(PDI), masculinity versus femininity (MAS), individualism versus collectivism (IDV), 
and uncertainty avoidance index (UAI)1. Differences in scores on these dimensions 
                                                
1 Long-term orientation is not included in the current study as it was added later on and the research that 
derived this fifth dimension does not have the same rigor as the other four dimensions. 
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reflect deeply ingrained differences in the perceptions of values, beliefs and traits. 
Members of a culture identify with a collective and provide a common ground for 
discussions and negotiations. They provide guidelines about processes as well as people’s 
expected behavior. 
Power distance refers to the extent to which unequal division of power is accepted 
in the society. Masculinity refers to a focus on values such as competitiveness, 
assertiveness, ambition, and the accumulation of wealth and material possessions, as 
opposed to femininity, which refers to values of relationships and quality of life. 
Individualism versus collectivism refers to whether members of a society would rather 
act in reference for themselves (individual) or a group (collectivism). Uncertainty 
avoidance reflects societies’ needs for rules and regulations in order to avoid anxiety due 
to uncertainty.   
Culture influences firms and businesses in multiple ways. First, it impacts a firm’s 
organizational philosophy (Hofstede, 1985). A firm’s values, beliefs and traits are 
reflective of the founder(s) and her (their) cultural background. To provide a simple 
example: firms from Japan tend to be more hierarchical in comparison to similar firms in 
the United States. Second, as a company grows internationally, it tends to hire employees 
locally, resulting in a more diverse workforce (Bolle, 1994). For example, Toyota Motor 
Corporation and McDonald’s, among many others, hire most of their employees locally. 
Third, culture impacts a firm as it ventures out to source and produce globally. When 
dealing internationally, firms need to acknowledge their partners’ expectations, for 
example, historically, in France the language is often used as a weapon that helps 
determine status in a relationship (Anonymous, 1996). The person that is more eloquent 
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in debate has an advantage (Cambell, Graham, Jolibert, & Meissner, 1988). Negotiators 
from France might be reluctant to talk in any language except French for this particular 
reason. In the same situation, they might consider it a weakness if their partner chose to 
talk imperfect French.  
2.2.7 Culture and its Relationship to TCE 
Companies with international operations face additional challenges compared to 
their domestic counterparts (Adler, Brahm, & Graham, 1992). As transaction cost 
economics theory highlights, higher levels of uncertainty are generally equated to higher 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). Dealing with companies from different countries 
increases uncertainty. Values, expectations, and behaviors are firmly anchored in the 
cultural background of the involved parties (Hall, 1976). The more different two 
countries are along the Hofstede cultural dimensions, the higher the likelihood of 
misunderstandings and hence the higher the uncertainty in the transaction.  
For example, a U.S. company dealing with a Chinese supplier needs to be aware 
of differences in its expectations and negotiation styles. While the U.S. firm’s 
representative was chosen according to her expertise in the area of interest, the Chinese 
company sends its vice-president into the negotiations to demonstrate the level of 
importance it places on this relationship. The Chinese firm can easily feel offended by 
dealing with someone who is of “lesser” status in the company – potentially resulting in 
failed interactions (Brett, 2007). The U.S. firm in this scenario would need to invest 
additional resources and hence money into either remedying the escalated situation or 
finding an alternative supplier.  
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In order to be successful on a global scale, firms and their managers needs to be 
aware of these kinds of problem. This research is aimed at shedding additional light on 
potential issues in international relationships, in particular, contractual negotiations. 
Based on the theoretic lens of transaction cost and the four cultural dimensions, the next 
section will develop the hypotheses.  
2.3 Hypotheses 
TCE motivates the presence of contracts as a means to control for opportunistic 
behavior that might arise due to uncertainty, asset specific investments, and the frequency 
of the transactions (Saussier, 1999). Saussier (2000) argued that as the cost of 
opportunism increases, companies are more willing to spend additional resources on 
creating a contract that addresses more potential areas of conflict – a more complete 
contract.  
In this section, a transaction cost based model is developed which links contract 
characteristics to culture, asset specificity, and frequency. Next, hypotheses are 
developed starting with the dimension of uncertainty and its relationship to TCE. 
Uncertainty is divided into two categories: Hofstede’s culture dimensions – measured as 
an average score per dyad – and cultural distance per dyad. The section concludes with 
hypotheses relating the dimensions of asset specificity and frequency to transaction costs. 
Figure 2 provides a graphic depiction of the investigated model. 
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Figure 2: Culture as a determinant of transaction cost 
 
Transaction costs cannot be measured directly and are generally examined 
through alternative proxies. Hence, this research uses three different dependent variables. 
I examine different characteristics of contracts – contract completeness, length, and the 
option to renegotiate a contract – and argue that all are related to the level of transaction 
cost in the buyer supplier relationship. The first variable is contract completeness. 
Saussier (2000) argued that as the costs for opportunism increases, companies are more 
willing to spend additional resources on creating a contract that addresses more potential 
areas of conflict. Second, contract length is employed. Similarly to contract 
completeness, it can be argued that as transaction cost increase, the involved parties will 
be more specific in the contract resulting in longer contracts. Finally, this study proposes 
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to use renegotiation as originally suggested by Crocker and Masten (1991). The authors 
used a binary variable of renegotiation provision in a contract. As transaction costs 
increase, providing the option to renegotiate prices rather than renegotiating complete 
contracts allows for contracts of a longer duration, and, therefore, reduces costs.  
As measures of uncertainty, this research uses two measures. One is based on the 
average dimension score for both buyer and supplier while the second investigates the 
cultural difference between the partners in a dyad. The reason for this binary approach is 
to get a better understanding of the intricacies of cross-cultural contractual interactions. 
The assessment of the average effect of each cultural dimension on a buyer-supplier 
relationship allows this study to observe differences between dyads that score high versus 
those that score low on a particular dimension. As both buyer and supplier are working 
together, an “average” score can be derived for each of the four Hofstede dimensions. 
With respect to cultural distance, a single measure (CDI) is used that assesses the 
cumulative difference across all four Hofstede dimensions between the two partners in 
the contractual relationship. 
Power Distance – The Hofstede-dimension of power distance (PDI) assesses a 
society’s expectancy and acceptance of hierarchical structures and authority (Hofstede & 
Bond, 1988; Kim, Park, & Suzuki, 1990). Countries that score low on this dimension 
such as Denmark or Israel generally have a more consultative or democratic 
understanding of dealing with each other. There are less hierarchical levels in both 
society and companies. Everybody in the society and the firm is allowed to express 
herself and contribute to decision-making processes. On the other hand, countries that 
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score high on this dimension have a more paternalistic and autocratic approach 
(Hofstede, 1983b).  
Average power distance score refers to an additive effect of each partner’s power 
distance score on the contract. The underlying argument is that two country pairs might 
be very similar in their score differences, while at the same time they can differ 
significantly from each other in their overall approach to hierarchies in society. The 
average power distance score is one way to measure this effect. Table 1 provides an 
example of this. The absolute cultural difference score for PDI is relatively low for both 
the buyer-supplier pairs of Australia and Norway (0 points) and Hong Kong and Taiwan 
(10 points).  Still, it is likely that due to their cultural differences, both country pairs will 
react differently when setting up the contracts. The average power distance score reflects 
this difference: the Sweden-Norway pair receives a score of 67 points while the Hong 
Kong – Taiwan pair has a score almost twice as high of 126 points. Other studies have 
used geographic distance (using geographic coordinates) in their models (Ojala & 
Tyrväinen, 2007) to control for this type of an effect. However, as the current example 
demonstrates, the geographic distance between Australia and Norway (about 9,000 miles) 
is significantly longer than the geographical distance between Hong Kong and Taiwan 
(about 450 miles) or even between Norway and Taiwan (about 5,500 miles) (Google 
Maps Api, 2009). Using Hofstede’s dimension to derive a measure for these potential 
effects deems to be a more appropriate approach and, thus, will be used in this study. 
  














Table 1: Average cultural dimension score 
 Country score  Country score Absolute difference Average score 
Buyer PDI MAS IDV UAI Supplier PDI MAS IDV UAI PDI MAS IDV UAI PDI MAS IDV UAI 
Norway 31 8 69 50 Taiwan 58 45 17 69 27 37 52 19 44.5 26.5 43 59.5 
Norway 31 8 69 50 Australia 36 61 90 51 5 53 21 1 33.5 34.5 79.5 50.5 
Hong 
Kong 68 57 25 29 Taiwan 58 45 17 69 10 12 8 40 63 51 21 49 
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Transaction cost economics stated that as uncertainty increases, transaction cost 
increases. Following this line of thought, it can be argued that as the average power distance of 
two partners increases, their respective countries’ societies are more accepting of inequality 
(Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Hence, overall, there is a higher need for control within these 
societies and an accompanying shift of power towards authority leaving less individual 
responsibilities, and less uncertainty. One potential solution to this issue is to provide a more 
complete contract.  Similarly, addressing more issues, and providing guidelines and rules to 
produce a level of control is associated with greater contract length. Finally, understanding an 
existing relationship is easier and more predictable than establishing a new relationship. Hence, 
the continuation of an existing contract through means of renegotiation increases the perceived 
level of power in the relationship. Therefore, this study proposes that as partners score 
averagely higher on the dimension of power distance, transaction costs increase.  




Masculinity – The dimension of masculinity refers to the competitiveness of a society 
(Hofstede, 1983b). Masculine countries such as Japan value characteristics such as 
assertiveness, ambition, and accumulation of wealth and material possessions. Acting 
aggressive and being assertive in negotiations is perceived as a strength and asset. In contrast, 
feminine countries such as Sweden tend be less aggressive and to put a higher emphasis on 
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relationships and quality of life (Steensma, Marino, Weaver, & Dickson, 2000). They also 
seem to have less defined gender roles in society.  
In the context of negotiations, compromise is of essence in feminine societies. On the 
contrary, more masculine countries are likely to put a higher emphasis on their own points of 
view; by stressing assertiveness and material possessions, they are more likely to behave 
opportunistically. As the average score on the masculinity dimension increases, the increased 
assertiveness by both partners likely results in less flexibility and increased tension. On the 
other hand, as the partners’ score is comparatively lower, there is a higher willingness to focus 
on the relationship and the mutual well being of both partners. In terms of transaction cost 
economics, this implies that as the average score increase, this study expects that the partners’ 
likelihood to behave opportunistically increases. Therefore, I hypothesize that greater average 
masculinity scores are linked to greater levels of contract completeness, greater contract length 
and the option to renegotiate the contract.  




Individualism – Hofstede’s individualism dimension refers to the extent to which 
members of a society are integrated into groups (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). On the one hand, in 
Anglo countries such as the U.S.A., Great Britain, and Austalia, that score high on this 
dimension, individuals are expected choose their own affiliations and fend for themselves. On 
the other hand, in Latin American countries, that score relatively low on this dimension, 
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individuals act predominantly as a member of a life-long group or organization (Hofstede, 
1983b).  
Similarly to the dimension of masculinity, high average scores of the individualism 
dimension are expected to be associated with high transaction costs. In countries that 
emphasize the individual, the firm is expected to follow the same mindset and look after itself 
and its interest first. This leads to the hypothesis that firms that have a high combined score on 
the dimension of individualism are more inclined to behave opportunistically. Companies that 
score comparatively low are more likely to identify a unit that consists of the two partners and, 
hence, act in their best mutual interest resulting in lower transaction cost. Therefore, I propose: 




Uncertainty Avoidance – The dimension uncertainty avoidance reflects a society’s 
approach to dealing with the extent to which members of a society attempt to cope with 
unknown, novel, surprising or even only different situations (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). As a 
countries score for uncertainty avoidance increases, they prefer to reduce anxiety by 
minimizing uncertainty: Change is often perceived as dangerous.  In cultures scoring high in 
uncertainty avoidance such as Mediterranean cultures, Latin America, and Japan, members of 
society prefer rules (e.g. about religion and food), formal laws and structured circumstances 
(Steensma et al., 2000). This is also reflected in the fact that “employees tend to remain longer 
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with their present employer” (Wikipedia, 2009). Countries that score high on this dimension 
perceive change as dangerous.  
Hofstede’s dimension of uncertainty avoidance reflects a society’s need for structure. 
Countries that score high on this dimension such as Spain or Argentina feel threatened by 
(future) uncertainty and ambiguous situations (Pheng & Yuquan, 2002). Rules and regulation 
provide a means to avoid anxiety caused by uncertainty. China and Hong Kong are countries 
that score low on this dimension implying and according to the theory, these countries are less 
in need of formal structure. Hence, this research hypothesizes that as the average score of 
uncertainty avoidance increases, the involved partners increase their efforts to reduce 
uncertainty in their relationship by means of a more complete contract, longer contracts and an 
option to renegotiate the contract.  




Cultural Distance – In addition to the characteristics of the buyer-supplier dyad 
regarding the individual cultural dimensions, the distance between buyer and seller across all 
the dimensions is also important. Cultural distance approximates the difference between two 
countries across the four (Kogut & Singh, 1988) cultural dimensions derived by Hofstede 
(1983). Kogut and Singh (1988) are the first to develop a widely accepted cultural distance 
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index (CDI) to measure the difference between two different countries across the Hofstede 
dimensions2. 
The more similar partners are, the more likely they are to reach a positive outcome in a 
negotiation (Adler & Graham, 1989). Similar behaviors and approaches towards conflict 
resolution as well as goal congruency and mutual benefits help supply chain partner “find and 
maintain a competitive advantage” (Mohr & Spekman, 1994, p.135).  Even perceived 
similarities between partners affect aspects such as degree of cooperation in a positive way 
(Adler & Graham, 1989). Reversing this argument, one can conclude that the more different – 
real or perceived – the more difficult it is for participants in a relationship to reach an outcome.  
Kaufmann and Carter (2006) derived a relationship, in the broader sense, between an 
increased cultural distance and uncertainty. Williamson (1979) posits that increased uncertainty 
results in higher transaction costs. The introduction of uncertainty in the context of 
international buyer-supplier relationship leads to a greater threat of opportunism as the 
involved firms fail to understand each other and ultimately leading to mistrust. As the cultural 
distance of the involved partners increases, the level of understanding decreases resulting in a 
higher level of uncertainty and, hence, higher transaction cost (Steensma et al., 2000). 
Therefore, greater cultural distance is expected to lead to greater levels of contract 
completeness in order to counter the potential increase in uncertainty. Similarly, greater 
cultural distance is likely to result in great contract length in order to specify in more detail the 
terms of the contract as well as to provide detailed explanations that in partners from the same 
                                                
2 Although it is possible to test for effects along each dimension separately, the results are not expected to differ 
from the combined measure of cultural difference. The theoretic argument is similar for the CDI measure as for 
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cultural background are not required or expected. Finally, as the negotiation of the contract 
between participants from different cultures results in increased uncertainty and, hence, 
requires more detailed negotiation, an option to renegotiate provides a potential of cost savings. 
It allows partners to adjust a limited set of options the contract in the future rather than 
negotiate a new deal. I, therefore, propose that: 




Asset Specificity – The most widely studied TCE characteristic is asset specificity and it 
refers to assets that are idiosyncratic to certain transactions. The concept has been studied 
repeatedly in the literature (for an overview, refer to David & Han, 2004; Rindfleisch & Heide, 
1997). As the level of asset importance increases, the involved parties are more inclined to 
enter an agreement that specifies details (Saussier, 1999). Mutual dependency arises due to 
investment in specific assets as well as the importance of the component or service to the 
buyer, generally resulting in longer (Joskow, 1987) and more complete contracts (Saussier, 
2000). Therefore, I hypothesize that as asset specificity increases, transaction costs increase 
resulting in higher levels of contract completeness, greater contract length and higher 
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Transaction Frequency – Transaction frequency is the least studied characteristic of 
transaction cost economics (Geyskens et al., 2006; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Williamson 
(1985a) argues that as the frequency of conducting a certain transaction increases, the involved 
bureaucratic cost due to the hierarchical structure are more than offset by the cost savings from 
conducting a greater number of transaction in the market. Thus, I propose that higher order 
frequency translates into lower transaction cost per unit, ultimately resulting in more complete 
contracts, longer contracts and an option to renegotiate the contract. 






 A Global Fortune 500 company located in Europe provided access to its contractual 
agreements. The company has a workforce of more than 20,000 employees and is represented 
in 40 countries worldwide. It prides itself with being progressive in terms of both business 
practices and environmental issues. The firm has contracts with suppliers in various countries 
around the globe and, depending on the circumstances, needs to source both locally (for site 
specific contracts) and globally (for products and services they apply to several sites and/or 
subsidiaries). The company has a rich and diverse base of contracts: for the currently study, I 
had access to buying contracts of various sizes mainly for the year of 2008. The company is 
subsequently referred to as Buyer.   
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2.4.1 Data Description 
The data set contains 190 observations from the headquarters and three subsidiaries of 
the Buyer. The contracts are all negotiated, set-up and monitored by the sourcing division of 
Buyer. I was allowed access to the contracts on site to read and code them. However, due to 
privacy concerns, access was limited to Buyer’s site. The contracts could not be removed from 
their site-specific locations. 
The sites are located on three different continents: Asia, Australia and Europe. The 
majority of the contracts are linked to Europe (89%), with only about 8% of the contracts from 
Asian and about 3% from the Australian subsidiary. This European orientation is due to several 
reasons: First, the organization has a European headquarter which is responsible for contracts 
that span the different subsidiaries. Second, the data were gathered on site at the headquarters 
and the European subsidiary. Third, the Asian subsidiary is currently being developed and as 
such does not have many contracts in place. The contracts from Asia are currently stored at the 
European headquarters. In the dataset, each buying location is noted and coded according to 
the Hofstede dimensions. 
 









North America 0 0 10 2 12 
South America 0 0 1 0 1 
Asia 0 0 22 0 22 
Australia 0 2 2 0 4 
Europe 36 28 61 26 151 
Total 36 30 96 28 190 
 
The suppliers are located around the globe in 25 different countries. As seen in Table 2, 
the majority of products are sourced from Europe (78.9%), followed by Asia (12.1%) and 
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North America (6.3%). Australia (2.1%) and South America (0.5%) supply only a very limited 
number of goods. Again, each supplying location is coded according to the Hofstede cultural 
dimensions.  
The types of contract vary significantly and are therefore classified along four product 
dimensions: construction, equipment/material, raw materials, and service. These product 
categories are used to partition the data set where required. In the complete set, dummy 
variables will be used to control for product group effects. The majority of contracts are for the 
purchase of raw materials (50.5%), followed by those for construction (18.9%), 
equipment/material (15.8) and service (14.7%). Please refer to Table 2 for an overview.  
The data were collected on site in Europe due to the sensitive nature of the information. 
At the headquarters, the coder had access to all contracts relating to the major raw material 
purchases from January 2008 to January 2009. The sourcing for raw materials is centrally 
coordinated from the headquarters. Also, on site at the headquarters, construction contracts for 
Asia are held. All contracts made available at Buyer’s headquarters were coded resulting in 85 
observations. At the European subsidiary, access was granted to all contracts held at the site for 
the past year. These contracts consisted mainly of contracts negotiated for local needs of the 
subsidiary but included contracts applicable to other subsidiaries as well. The coder randomly 
selected contracts for this site resulting in a total of 105 observations.3  
As a control measure for coder reliability, a second coder (internal to Buyer to avoid 
breach of confidentiality in the agreement with Buyer) was asked to code a number of 
contracts. The two coders’ output was identical for every single coding except for one code in 
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one observation. The issue was related to the scale (binary rather than ordinal) of the variable. 
The variable was dropped from the final dataset.  
2.4.2 Variables 
2.4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Contract Completeness is calculated as a composite measure expanding on Saussier’s 
(2000) study that used six dimensions. His study concentrated on a very narrowly defined type 
of contract (between imported coal transporters and one French electricity company) 
generating a homogenous dataset. He defined contract completeness based on six dimensions, 
namely: buyer’s and supplier’s minimum quantity, buyer and supplier penalties in case of 
default, price index (specific to French contracts as they require a transaction price in order to 
be legally binding) and a dispute resolution clause (Saussier, 2000).  
The current study’s dataset is much more diverse and as such included additional 
factors. The contract completeness variable consists of 19 individual dimensions (described in 
Table 3) that could be specified in the contract. Inclusion of a dimension in the contract 
receives a score of one. The complete score is calculated by summing the dimensional scores 
with each dimension receiving the same weight. The lower the final score, the less complete 
the contract. This variable hence is not a continuous variable but ordinal. Please refer to Table 
3 for an overview of the contract completeness dimensions. The table provides an overview of 
the name of each dimension and a short description. The maximum score a contract 
theoretically can achieve is 19 and the lowest 0. Table 4 details the main variables in the model 
and one can observe that the average contract consists of about six dimensions: the least 
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detailed contract only mentioning one and the most detailed covering 16 out of 19 potential 
dimensions. 
Table 3: Contract completeness dimensions 
  Variable Name Description 
1 Buyer's quantity flexibility Buyer's flexibility to change order quantity 
2 Confidentiality 
Explicit mentioning of keeping the information confidential between 
the involved parties 
3 
Definition section/ Rules for 
interpreting 
Explicitly mentioned in contract 
4 Dispute Dispute resolution explicitly mentioned in the contract 
5 
General conditions of 
purchase (GCoP)  
Standardized set of rules and regulations governing the contract 
6 
Health, safety, environment, 
and corp. soc. resp. 
Explicit mentioning of one of all of these aspects in the contract (often 
bundled in one section) 
7 Labeling Explicit instruction for labeling 
8 Mutual fairness Explicit mentioning of mutual fairness  




Level of formality in purchase order 
11 Quality assurance Explicit mentioning of a certificate of analysis 
12 Quantity discount Explicit mentioning of quantity discount in the contract 
13 Regular progress reports Explicit mentioning of regular progress reports 
14 Renegotiation Explicit mention to renegotiate part of the contract 
15 Subcontracting Explicit mentioning of subcontracting 
16 Supplier's default penalties Penalty for supplier if goods are not delivered on time 
17 Supplier's fixed quantity Supplier required to deliver fixed quantity 
18 Taxes Explicit mentioning of taxes 
19 Warranty Explicit mentioning of a warranty 
Length of the contract is the physical length measured in the number of pages. It is 
provides an approximation of the amount of effort invested into the negotiation of the contract. 
More complete contracts are likely to be longer. As such, this dependent variable is a simpler 
(and cruder) measurement of the complexity of the contract. The average length of a contract is 
5.45 pages (Table 4).  
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Renegotiation is a binary variable that refers to the explicit mentioning of the need to 
renegotiation part of the contract (Crocker & Masten, 1991). Setting up contracts is time 
consuming and, hence, expensive. Providing the option for renegotiation, allows the involved 
parties to adjust certain aspects of the contract (i.e. prices, terms of delivery) without the need 
to readdress all other dimensions. 24.7% of all contracts contained the option to renegotiate 
part of the contract at a later time (Table 4).  
2.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
Cultural distance (CD) is measured using the country of both buyer and supplier and 
applying Hofstede’s (1983a) cultural dimension scores for each of the four dimensions (PDI, 
MAS, IDV, UAI). The cultural distance index (CDI) (Kogut & Singh, 1988) is used to 
calculate a measure of cultural distance. They derived a composite measure for cultural 
distance based on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as:  
 
where Iij refers to the index of Hofstede’s ith cultural dimension (i.e. PDI, IDV, MAS, and 
UAI) “and jth country, Vi is the variance of the index in the ith dimension,” (Kogut & Singh, 
1988, p. 422) k indicates the reference country.  
 As can be observed from Table 4, the primary independent variable of cultural 
distance has a mean score of 2, with scores ranging from 0 to 9.36. This relatively low average 
score for the relationships is due to the fact that the majority of contracts were negotiated 
between European partners.  
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Asset specificity is measured according to Williamson using a binary variable. Each 
contract is checked for an explicit mentioning of either dedicated or human assets. If either one 
of these is present, asset specificity is considered to be present in the contract and coded as 1, 
otherwise 0. The majority of contracts do not include asset specificity statements: only 4.2% of 
all the contracts explicitly mention either human or dedicated assets. 
Frequency was also measured using a binary variable. The contracts were categorized 
as either one-time or multiple (repeated-type) purchases. A little more than half the contracts 
concern products that are purchased on a regular basis while 48% of the contracts are non-
standard purchases. 
2.4.2.3 Control Variables 
Product category is a measure described earlier (see Table 1) and provides a control for 
product type specific variations in the contracts. I categorize the different products into 
construction, equipment/material, raw materials, and service. The first category, construction, 
refers to material and work related to the construction and maintenance of factory structures. It 
includes materials for the construction of the site in Asia, but also regular maintenance of 
reconstructing buildings on an existing site in Europe. Of all contracts, 18.9% fall into this 
category. The second category, equipment/material, refers to machinery and equipment 
purchased. This includes factory equipment but also work apparel and computer equipment. 
About 15.8% of all contracts belong to this category. The third category, raw materials, refers 
to products that are purchased in bulk for on-going production. This is the largest category and 
comprises a little more than 50% of all contracts (50.5%). The last category, service, refers to 
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service and maintenance agreements, such as cleaning services of a site, and security contracts. 
About 14.7% of all contracts fall into this category. 
 
Common refers to the law that applies to the contract. This includes indirect assignment 
of a governing law through the General Conditions of Purchase4. There are three main types of 
legal systems, namely civil, common and Islamic law (Powell & Mitchell, 2007). Only the first 
two are applied to the contracts in the current study. Civil law is the type of law used in the 
majority of countries around the world and uses a codebook or collection of articles (legislative 
statues) that are referred to when ruling in a court of law. This type of law dominates in South 
and Central America, most European countries, Asian countries (Japan, mainland China, 
Russia) and Africa (Madagascar, Congo, Algeria). A common law system is developed over 
time based on decisions and precedents in courts of law by judges. Countries that employ this 
legal system are the U.S.A. (except for Louisiana), Britain and many former British colonies 
such as India, Pakistan, Australia and Ghana. As civil law is based on a set of laws and 
regulation, the pure reference to these laws is sufficient to make them binding. In addition, the 
system takes negotiated intent into account. In a common law setting, there is no such 
reference set. Hence, the negotiating parties are required to specify greater levels of the detail 
in the contract. Underlying intension is not enforceable in a court of law unless it has been 
specified in writing in the contract. As such, contracts negotiated under common law are 
expected to be more elaborate and hence longer than contracts under civil law. Table 4 shows 
that the majority of contracts (86.7%) in this data set are governed by civil law and only about 
13.3% use common law. Given the dominance of European contracts, this distribution is 
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reasonable. Two contracts were not coded for this variable, as they had no explicit mentioning 
of the governing law, resulting on a final sample size of 188 observations.  
Duration of the contract refers to the length of the contract in terms of time (measured 
in months). Due to type of contract and relationship with suppliers, the contracts under 
investigation range from 1-time purchases (0.033 months) to repeated deliveries over a longer 
period of time (up to ten years or 120 months). The average contract is a little more than a year 
(12.73 months) The underlying assumption for this control variable is that the longer the 
duration, the higher the interdependence of buyer and supplier and, hence, a likely influence to 
increase the level of contract completeness.  
Company size categorizes for the size of the supplier into small (up to 99 employees), 
mid-size (100 up to 1000 employees) and large companies (more than 1000 employees). This 
measure takes into account differences that might arise due to size variation such as the power 
structure in the relationship. As the suppliers range from large multinational corporations to 
small, local, privately held firms, we use broad categories to control these potential size effects. 
Each category holds about 1/3 of the observations (small: 31.6%, mid-sized: 33.7%; large: 
34.7%). 
Year and buyer subsidiary dummies are added to the model to control for year and firm 
effects. As the dataset contains cross-sectional rather than panel data, we account for variations 
due to the year the contract was written. External events to the company could impact the 
manner in which the contract is composed. Similar, it is expected that each subsidiary of the 
buyer has idiosyncrasies that go beyond the national, cultural background that influence the 
manner in which the contract is established. More than two thirds of contracts in out dataset 
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were written in 2009 (23.2%) and 2008 (47.4%). The other contracts were written in the years 
2004 to 2007: 1.1% in 2004, 4.7% in 2005, 6.3% in 2006 and 16.8% in 2007.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of model variables 
Variable name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Contract completeness 190 5.984 2.857 1 16 
Contract length 190 5.458 6.638 1 40 
Renegotiation 190 0.247 0.433 0 1 
Cultural distance 190 2.000 2.636 0 9.355 
Cum. power distance score 190 79.774 19.417 42 157 
Cum. masculinity score 190 98.963 35.883 16 145 
Cum. individuality score 190 129.763 19.516 77 181 
Cum. uncertainty avoidance score 190 116.200 20.324 63 154 
Asset specificity 190 0.042 0.201 0 1 
Frequency 190 0.516 0.501 0 1 
Large supplier 190 0.347 0.477 0 1 
Mid-size supplier 190 0.337 0.474 0 1 
Small supplier 190 0.316 0.466 0 1 
Common law 188 0.133 0.340 0 1 
Civil law 188 0.867 0.340 0 1 
Duration 190 12.732 21.617 0.033 120 
Construction contracts 190 0.189 0.393 0 1 
Raw material contracts 190 0.505 0.501 0 1 
Equipment contracts 190 0.158 0.366 0 1 
Service contracts 190 0.147 0.355 0 1 
Headquarter (Europe) 190 0.368 0.484 0 1 
European subsidiary 190 0.521 0.501 0 1 
Asian subsidiary 190 0.079 0.270 0 1 
Australian subsidiary 190 0.032 0.175 0 1 
Year dummy 2004 190 0.011 0.102 0 1 
Year dummy 2005 190 0.047 0.213 0 1 
Year dummy 2006 190 0.063 0.244 0 1 
Year dummy 2007 190 0.168 0.375 0 1 
Year dummy 2008 190 0.474 0.501 0 1 
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2.5 Empirical Results 
I analyzed the impact of cultural distance, the average cultural dimensions, asset 
specificity and frequency on contract completeness using correlation analysis and ordered logit 
regression. Table 5 details the correlation of the hypothesized variables: cultural distance has a 
high, positive correlation with average power distance score (0.756), and a high, negative 
correlation with the average individuality (-0.701) and average uncertainty avoidance (-0.625) 
scores. In addition, the correlation between average power distance score and average 
individuality score is -0.730 indicating strong, negative correlation. For example, a buyer-
supplier pair that comes from Europe is likely to score high on the average individuality but 
low on the average power distance dimension, while those from Asia would be more likely to 
stress power distance and collectivism.   
Table 5: Correlation table 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Cultural distance 1      
2 Cum. power distance score 0.756 1     
3 Cum. masculinity score -0.381 -0.121 1    
4 Cum. individuality score -0.701 -0.730 0.079 1   
5 Cum. uncertainty avoidance score -0.625 -0.267 0.463 0.219 1  
6 Asset specificity -0.142 -0.125 -0.041 0.245 -0.063 1 
7 Frequency 0.233 0.029 -0.367 -0.176 -0.266 -0.216 
 
2.5.1 Estimation Results 
This study uses several different regression models. For subset a of the hypotheses, an 
ordered logit model is used to analyze the data (Table 6). As the dependent variable, contract 
completeness, is measured along an ordinal scale, ordinary least squares (OLS) is technically 
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not appropriate: it assumes the dependent variable to be continuous. The ordered logit model is 
an extension of the logistics regression model that allows for multiple ordered responses of the 
dependent variable without assuming equal distance between each answer. In the current 
context that implies that a score of 3 implies a less complete contract than a score of 6, 
however, it does not mean that the second contract is twice as complete as the first as can be 
assumed in the case of continuous variables. In the current study, the OLS output is also 
reported (Table 7) as the pseudo r-square of the ordered logit model is difficult to interpret 
(Baum, 2006). Similar to Saussier (2000), I find no significant differences in the results of 
these two types of regressions. For contract length, subset b of the hypotheses, an OLS model 
is used (Table 8). Finally, for the option to renegotiate the contract, I use a logit model as the 
dependent variable is binary (Table 9).  
The first model in each table combines all four average cultural dimensions within one 
model. Although the correlation table suggested high correlations between some of the 
dimensions, I find no significant effect of multicollinearity between the dimensions (using 
variance inflation factors with VIF of 10 as a cut-off (Baum, 2006)). However, to substantiate 
these findings, I run each average score separately in a model and find consistent results 
(Models 2 – 5; Models ii – vi, Models II-V).  
For the dependent variable of contract completeness (Table 6), the results show no 
significant statistical support for hypotheses H1a and H2a. Higher average power distance (H1a: 
Model 2) and higher average masculinity (H2a: Model 3) scores have no significant influence 
the level of contract completeness. Surprisingly, the results show that both average 
individuality (Model 4) and average uncertainty avoidance (Model 5) have a statistically 
significant, negative effect on contract completeness implying they reduce the level of contract 
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completeness. Hence, H3a and H4a are not supported as predicted: I actually find the opposite 
effect. 
For the dependent variable of contract length (Table 8), I find that statistical support for 
hypothesis H2b that greater average masculinity scores in a buyer-supplier relationship result in 
longer contract (Model III). The other three average Hofstede dimensions (H1b: Model II, H3b: 
Model IV and H4b: Model V) have no statistically significant effect on the length of the 
contract. Regarding the option to renegotiate the contract as dependent variable, none of the 
four average Hofstede dimensions has a significant effect (H1c: Model ii, H2c: Model iii, H3c: 
Model iv and H4c: Model v).  
Model 6 estimates the results for cultural distance between buyer and supplier and its 
effect on contract completeness. I find strong support for the main hypothesis (H5a): greater 
cultural distance results in greater contract completeness. The relationship between cultural 
distance and contract length is not statistically significant (H5b: Model VI). Finally, in Table 9, 
one can observe that at the 10% level, I find greater cultural distance reduces the likelihood of 
a renegotiation option in the contract (H5c: Model vi). This finding is surprising as I 
hypothesized that greater cultural distance is more likely to result in the option to renegotiate 
the contract.  
All models in Table 6 and Table 9 find statistically significant support for the positive 
influence of asset specificity on contract completeness (H6a) and the option to renegotiate 
(H6c). However, I do not find statistical significant results for a positive influence of asset 
specificity on contract length (H6b: Table 8). Finally, all models find statistically significant 
support that frequency is negatively related to contract completeness. In all models, greater 
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frequency results in lower contract completeness (H7). Again, this finding is counter to the 
hypothesized direction of relationship. 
Next, I discuss the different outcomes for the control variables. The results show that 
supplier size does influence the level of contract completeness. Large suppliers tend to 
negotiate less complete contracts than mid-size or small supplier firms. Similarly, small 
suppliers appear to favor the option of renegotiation when compared to large supplier firms. 
The type of contract significantly influences the level of contract completeness, contract length 
and the option to renegotiate the contract. The current models use construction contracts as a 
reference category. The results show that all other contracts are significantly more complete 
than construction contracts. Similarly, the construction contracts tend to be significantly shorter 
than the other contracts. With respect to the option to renegotiate, raw material contracts are 
more likely to include this clause when compared to construction contracts. Contracts 
negotiated under the common law system are generally more complete and longer than those 
using civil law. The type of law system employed does not seem to be that important when 
considering the option to renegotiate the contract. The results in Table 9 show that only some 
of the models show marginal statistical significance. The duration of the contract has no impact 
on the level of contract completeness, the length of the contract or the option to renegotiate the 
contract.  
With respect to year effects, I find only an effect for the year of 2007 in comparison to 
the year of 2009 for contract completeness: Contracts in 2007 were statistically significantly 
more complete than in 2009 (Table 6). I find marginally significantly longer contracts in 2005 
when compared to 2009 (Table 8). There are no statistical differences between the reference  
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Table 6: Ordered logit model results for contract completeness (DV) 
Ordered logit 
model 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Predicted 
-0.0264 0.0131     Average power 
distance  (-1.560) (1.424)     
H1a: + 
0.00225  0.00482    Average 
masculinity  (0.317)  (0.702)    
H2a: + 
-0.0365**   -0.0211***   Average 
individuality  (-2.574)   (-2.786)   
H3a: + 
-0.0204**    -0.0241***  Avg. uncertainty 
avoidance  (-2.442)    (-2.918)  
H4a: + 
     0.190*** Cultural distance 
     (2.738) 
H5a: + 
2.431** 2.285** 2.186** 2.386** 2.235** 2.638*** Asset specificity 
(2.559) (2.437) (2.357) (2.530) (2.418) (2.709) 
H6a: + 
-1.688*** -1.651*** -1.616*** -1.705*** -1.609*** -1.693*** Frequency  
(-3.777) (-3.779) (-3.723) (-3.867) (-3.652) (-3.832) 
H7a: + 
1.005** 0.974** 1.016*** 0.968** 0.974** 0.989***  Mid-size supplier 
(2.558) (2.517) (2.625) (2.524) (2.501) (2.577)  
0.744* 0.682* 0.665 0.668 0.804* 0.738*  Small supplier 
(1.783) (1.648) (1.597) (1.619) (1.943) (1.785)  
2.397** 1.747** 1.670* 2.164** 1.613* 1.916**  Common law 
(2.513) (1.962) (1.887) (2.360) (1.811) (2.135)  
0.0154* 0.0134 0.0127 0.0146 0.0143 0.0137  Duration 
(1.663) (1.518) (1.440) (1.604) (1.611) (1.539)  
2.256*** 2.244*** 2.371*** 2.184*** 2.268*** 2.148***  Raw material 
contracts (3.650) (3.720) (3.994) (3.619) (3.754) (3.599)  
1.144** 1.188** 1.181** 1.218** 1.060* 1.176**  Equipment 
contracts (2.022) (2.151) (2.144) (2.194) (1.898) (2.119)  
1.233** 1.137** 1.124** 1.212** 1.063* 1.232**  Service contracts 
(2.184) (2.057) (2.048) (2.173) (1.910) (2.203)  
-0.264 -0.952 -1.010 -0.569 -0.883 -1.088  Australian 
subsidiary (-0.248) (-1.067) (-1.018) (-0.653) (-1.017) (-1.223)  
-0.303 -0.600 -0.888 -0.667 -0.0391 -0.259  European 
subsidiary (-0.417) (-1.189) (-1.288) (-1.322) (-0.0733) (-0.505)  
1.870 1.171 1.737* 0.892 2.259** 1.029  Asian subsidiary 
(1.634) (1.045) (1.711) (0.834) (2.250) (0.986)  
1.218 1.939 1.639 1.642 1.815 1.814  Year dummy 2004 
(0.872) (1.269) (1.157) (1.139) (1.199) (1.230)  
0.0534 0.172 0.137 0.0473 0.322 0.215  Year dummy 2005 
(0.0611) (0.201) (0.160) (0.0546) (0.375) (0.250)  
1.203 1.180 1.228* 1.127 1.340* 1.179  Year dummy 2006 
(1.525) (1.593) (1.656) (1.497) (1.747) (1.571)  
1.202*** 0.911** 0.804* 1.041** 1.016** 1.223***  Year dummy 2007 
(2.617) (2.029) (1.817) (2.311) (2.249) (2.586)  
0.503 0.738** 0.697* 0.637* 0.660* 0.635*  Year dummy 2008 
(1.381) (2.030) (1.902) (1.768) (1.826) (1.748)  
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188  
Pseudo R2 0.161 0.144 0.143 0.151 0.152 0.151  
Log likelihood -362.898 -370.171 -370.938 -367.319 -366.920 -367.405  
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Table 7: OLS results for contract completeness (DV) 
OLS Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Predicted 
-0.024 0.015     Average power 
distance  (-1.180) (1.300)     
H1a: + 
0.001  0.005    Average 
masculinity  (0.133)  (0.554)    
H2a: + 
-0.037**   -0.025**   Average 
individuality  (-2.189)   (-2.598)   
H3a: + 
-0.022**    -0.027***  Avg. uncertainty 
avoidance  (-2.157)    (-2.726)  
H4a: + 
     0.231*** Cultural distance 
     (2.679) 
H5a: + 
2.679*** 2.714*** 2.611** 2.765*** 2.613*** 3.032*** Asset specificity 
(2.684) (2.658) (2.554) (2.757) (2.618) (2.991) 
H6a: + 
-1.939*** -2.002*** -1.966*** -2.012*** -1.918*** -2.023*** Frequency  
(-4.142) (-4.175) (-4.088) (-4.260) (-4.068) (-4.287) 
H7a: + 
0.896** 0.875* 0.947** 0.854* 0.913** 0.893**  Mid-size supplier 
(2.042) (1.957) (2.127) (1.959) (2.107) (2.058)  
0.553 0.486 0.490 0.468 0.598 0.529  Small supplier 
(1.195) (1.036) (1.031) (1.016) (1.298) (1.151)  
2.407** 1.772* 1.710* 2.248** 1.710* 1.996**  Common law 
(2.309) (1.738) (1.669) (2.195) (1.705) (1.979)  
0.0158* 0.0139 0.0133 0.0152 0.0140 0.0137  Duration 
(1.683) (1.448) (1.383) (1.608) (1.484) (1.455)  
2.047*** 2.204*** 2.355*** 2.069*** 2.204*** 2.056***  Raw material 
contracts (3.207) (3.376) (3.659) (3.226) (3.483) (3.207)  
1.127* 1.211** 1.204** 1.210** 1.110* 1.213**  Equipment contracts 
(1.974) (2.073) (2.051) (2.103) (1.931) (2.111)  
1.040* 1.022 1.031* 1.078* 0.939 1.094*  Service contracts 
(1.716) (1.651) (1.659) (1.766) (1.540) (1.794)  
-0.684 -1.450 -1.521 -0.912 -1.473 -1.538  Australian 
subsidiary (-0.523) (-1.299) (-1.226) (-0.836) (-1.355) (-1.411)  
-0.408 -0.807 -1.115 -0.830 -0.176 -0.351  European subsidiary 
(-0.492) (-1.385) (-1.388) (-1.445) (-0.285) (-0.586)  
1.651 1.188 1.852 0.803 2.242* 0.937  Asian subsidiary 
(1.238) (0.880) (1.506) (0.635) (1.904) (0.755)  
1.223 1.954 1.653 1.556 1.871 1.790  Year dummy 2004 
(0.766) (1.234) (1.042) (1.002) (1.208) (1.155)  
0.0420 0.157 0.187 -0.0522 0.386 0.142  Year dummy 2005 
(0.0428) (0.158) (0.188) (-0.0531) (0.394) (0.145)  
1.377 1.333 1.394 1.232 1.551* 1.310  Year dummy 2006 
(1.652) (1.565) (1.632) (1.467) (1.856) (1.566)  
1.213** 0.970* 0.864 1.087** 1.092** 1.298**  Year dummy 2007 
(2.258) (1.783) (1.596) (2.023) (2.037) (2.345)  
0.577 0.779* 0.759* 0.653 0.766* 0.690  Year dummy 2008 
(1.345) (1.814) (1.744) (1.530) (1.812) (1.626)  
Constant 13.07*** 3.130*** 3.910*** 7.635*** 6.965*** 3.667***  
 (3.603) (2.655) (3.976) (4.767) (5.153) (4.129)  
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188  
R2 0.539 0.507 0.503 0.521 0.523 0.522  
Adj. R2 0.481 0.454 0.450 0.470 0.472 0.471  
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Table 8: OLS results for contract length (DV) 
OLS Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Predicted 
0.001 0.0189     Average power 
distance  (0.024) (0.601)     
H1a: + 
0.053**  0.055**    Average 
masculinity  (2.272)  (2.396)    
H2a: + 
-0.002   -0.018   Average 
individuality  (-0.052)   (-0.667)   
H3a: + 
-0.019    -0.023  Avg. uncertainty 
avoidance  (-0.688)    (-0.851)  
H4a: + 
     -0.021 Cultural distance 
     (-0.0857) 
H5a: + 
-0.221 -0.647 -0.274 -0.693 -0.791 -0.877 Asset specificity 
(-0.081) (-0.236) (-0.102) (-0.253) (-0.290) (-0.316) 
H6a: + 
-3.298** -3.397*** -3.328*** -3.385*** -3.310** -3.350** Frequency  
(-2.569) (-2.627) (-2.619) (-2.620) (-2.564) (-2.588) 
H7a: + 
1.304 1.572 1.359 1.609 1.646 1.705  Mid-size supplier 
(1.084) (1.305) (1.155) (1.348) (1.387) (1.432)  
-0.303 0.125 -0.353 0.145 0.244 0.191  Small supplier 
(-0.235) (0.098) (-0.277) (0.114) (0.192) (0.150)  
8.048*** 8.310*** 8.004*** 8.621*** 8.238*** 8.235***  Common law 
(2.823) (3.030) (2.964) (3.086) (3.008) (2.986)  
0.003 0.00569 0.00253 0.00648 0.00561 0.00528  Duration 
(0.119) (0.220) (0.100) (0.251) (0.218) (0.204)  
5.627*** 5.742*** 5.781*** 5.739*** 5.808*** 5.977***  Raw material 
contracts (3.221) (3.269) (3.407) (3.279) (3.360) (3.405)  
7.476*** 7.398*** 7.531*** 7.388*** 7.306*** 7.371***  Equipment 
contracts (4.786) (4.706) (4.865) (4.702) (4.649) (4.685)  
3.372** 3.384** 3.432** 3.423** 3.314** 3.384**  Service contracts 
(2.031) (2.029) (2.091) (2.053) (1.986) (2.025)  
0.080 -0.32 -0.54 -0.85 0.141 -0.697  Australian 
subsidiary (0.022) (-0.0971) (-0.168) (-0.259) -0.0417 (-0.207)  
-0.083 -3.476 -0.164 -3.986 -3.546 -3.802  European 
subsidiary (-0.023) (-1.158) (-0.0501) (-1.339) (-1.194) (-1.275)  
-4.995 -7.689** -5.1 -8.022** -6.543* -6.903*  Asian subsidiary 
(-1.249) (-2.104) (-1.463) (-2.114) (-1.877) (-1.950)  
3.873 4.92 3.741 4.513 4.765 4.631  Year dummy 2004 
(0.886) (1.155) (0.894) (1.065) (1.126) (1.092)  
-4.898* -4.694* -5.000* -4.809* -4.467* -4.610*  Year dummy 2005 
(-1.820) (-1.752) (-1.895) (-1.787) (-1.667) (-1.720)  
2.977 3.181 2.903 3.16 3.409 3.308  Year dummy 2006 
(1.303) (1.387) (1.287) (1.378) (1.491) (1.444)  
1.289 1.48 1.095 1.512 1.567 1.338  Year dummy 2007 
(0.843) (0.976) (0.737) (0.995) (1.030) (0.857)  
0.610 0.976 0.628 0.889 0.97 0.994  Year dummy 2008 
(0.516) (0.840) (0.545) (0.760) (0.835) (0.852)  
-1.875 0.666 -4.094 4.897 4.405 2.301  Constant 
(-0.158) (0.144) (-0.892) (0.886) (0.960) (0.589)  
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185  
R-squared 0.376 0.354 0.374 0.354 0.355 0.352  
Adj. R2 0.296 0.284 0.306 0.284 0.285 0.282  
t-statistics in parentheses, *** sig. at the 1% level, ** sig. at the 5% level, * sig. at the 10% level  
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Table 9: Logit regression results for renegotiation (DV) 
Logit Model ii Model iii Model iv Model v Model vi Model i Predicted 
-0.029 -0.038     Average power 
distance  (-0.905) (-1.513)     
H1c: + 
0.011  0.00751    Average 
masculinity  (0.683)  (0.47)    
H2c: + 
0.019   0.0325   
Average 
individuality  
(0.658)   (1.39)   
H3c: + 
0.00156    -0.001  
Avg. uncertainty 
avoidance  
(0.073)    (-0.053)  
H4c: + 
     -0.493* Cultural distance 
     (-1.948) 
H5c: + 
3.750*** 3.552*** 3.837*** 3.746*** 3.732*** 3.269** Asset specificity 
(2.609) (2.610) (2.641) (2.668) (2.667) (2.423) 
H6c: + 
-2.931*** -2.940*** -2.955*** -2.988*** -2.983*** -2.861*** Frequency  
(-3.437) (-3.473) (-3.478) (-3.504) (-3.514) (-3.406) 
H7ch: + 
0.193 0.281 -0.0775 0.097 -0.02 0.0752  Mid-size supplier 
(0.215) (0.315) (-0.0869) (0.112) (-0.0227) (0.082)  
1.924** 2.073** 1.789** 2.001** 1.905** 2.112**  Small supplier 
(2.149) (2.405) (2.037) (2.354) (2.254) (2.304)  
3.315 3.489* 2.892* 2.878 2.942* 3.539*  Common law 
(1.576) (1.766) (1.662) (1.532) (1.692) (1.774)  
0.00631 0.00847 0.0081 0.00616 0.00853 0.00856  Duration 
(0.447) (0.610) (0.601) (0.442) (0.635) (0.613)  
5.182*** 5.104*** 4.648*** 5.050*** 4.679*** 5.479*** 
 Raw material 
contracts 
(4.221) (4.258) (4.051) (4.286) (4.104) (4.251)  
0.0534 0.0324 0.0604 0.128 0.0802 0.0772 
 Equipment 
contracts 
(0.063) (0.038) (0.072) (0.151) (0.095) (0.090)  
1.771* 1.746* 1.699* 1.732* 1.699* 1.702*  Service contracts 
(1.924) (1.927) (1.868) (1.895) (1.868) (1.857)  
7.102** 6.263** 5.868** 7.327*** 5.873** 6.399** 
 Australian 
subsidiary 
(2.363) (2.437) (2.444) (2.603) (2.422) (2.455)  
4.51 2.988 3.245 4.090* 2.734 3.890* 
 European 
subsidiary 
(1.588) (1.362) (1.401) (1.690) (1.346) (1.689)  
5.139* 3.662* 2.263 4.463* 2.008 4.536**  Asian subsidiary 
(1.845) (1.732) (1.194) (1.715) (1.120) (1.999)  
-0.85 -0.964 -0.509 -0.077 -0.361 -0.463  Year dummy 2004 
(-0.352) (-0.409) (-0.254) (-0.0397) (-0.186) (-0.234)  
-1.112 -1.058 -1.104 -0.887 -1.008 -1.168  Year dummy 2005 
(-0.727) (-0.719) (-0.784) (-0.604) (-0.719) (-0.779)  
1.763 1.748 1.437 1.72 1.502 1.982  Year dummy 2006 
(1.382) (1.380) (1.140) (1.355) (1.179) (1.560)  
1.045 1.135 1.123 1.188 1.209 0.756  Year dummy 2007 
(0.972) (1.088) (1.068) (1.131) (1.151) (0.697)  
0.772 0.75 0.725 0.941 0.787 0.852  Year dummy 2008 
(0.892) (0.899) (0.903) (1.107) (0.977) (1.015)  
-12.49* -6.991** -9.909*** -15.16*** -8.983*** -9.808***  Constant 
(-1.667) (-2.284) (-3.025) (-2.787) (-2.714) (-3.319)  
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185  
Log likelihood -55.64 -56.11 -57.23 -56.29 -57.34 -55.01  
Pseudo R2 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.47  
t-statistics in parentheses, *** sig. at the 1% level, ** sig. at the 5% level, * sig. at the 10% level    
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Table 10: Ordered logit model results for contract completeness (DV) for differences in each cultural 
dimension 
Ordered logit model 
Model a Model b Model c Model d 
0.0429***    
Diff. Power Distance (4.074)    
 0.0115   
Diff. Masculinity  (1.501)   
  0.0408***  
Diff. Individuality   (4.010)  
   0.0141 Diff. Uncertainty 
Avoidance    (1.002) 
2.138** 1.524* 2.233** 1.501 Asset specificity 
(2.141) (1.657) (2.145) (1.628) 
-1.358*** -1.304*** -1.365*** -1.251*** Frequency  
(-3.173) (-3.089) (-3.180) (-2.998) 
0.734** 0.933** 0.640* 0.823** Mid-size supplier 
(1.992) (2.496) (1.727) (2.234) 
0.827** 0.924** 0.806** 0.754* Small supplier 
(2.011) (2.230) (1.965) (1.834) 
1.581* 1.251 1.588* 1.366 Common law 
(1.841) (1.489) (1.824) (1.639) 
0.0127 0.0118 0.0117 0.0107 Duration 
(1.466) (1.395) (1.349) (1.268) 
0.788 1.078* 0.796 0.908 Raw material 
contracts (1.413) (1.944) (1.447) (1.551) 
1.605*** 1.351** 1.575*** 1.364** Equipment contracts 
(2.920) (2.498) (2.868) (2.530) 
1.134** 1.015* 1.062* 0.970* Service contracts 
(2.035) (1.869) (1.925) (1.798) 
0.286 -0.539 0.722 -0.432 European subsidiary 
(0.301) (-0.585) (0.704) (-0.472) 
0.528 -0.29 1.015 0.117 European headquarter 
(0.626) (-0.328) (1.120) (0.141) 
-0.496 0.496 0.293 0.347 Asian subsidiary 
(-0.448) (0.470) (0.259) (0.319) 
-0.724 -0.432 -0.419 -0.345 Year dummy 2004 
(-0.450) (-0.251) (-0.242) (-0.198) 
-0.457 -0.349 -0.521 -0.427 Year dummy 2005 
(-0.531) (-0.416) (-0.598) (-0.507) 
0.534 0.958 0.781 0.766 Year dummy 2006 
(0.714) (1.281) (1.026) (1.034) 
1.182** 0.67 0.965** 0.689 Year dummy 2007 
(2.371) (1.386) (1.961) (1.398) 
0.698* 0.727* 0.814** 0.724* Year dummy 2008 
(1.891) (1.944) (2.179) (1.931) 
Observations 184 184 184 184 
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.076 0.093 0.075 
Log likelihood -381.512 -388.874 -381.865 -389.496 
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year of 2009 and other years with respect to the dependent variable of renegotiating the 
contract. 
In terms of effects due to the buying firm subsidiary, I find no or only marginally 
significant effect on contract completeness. Only the Asian subsidiary has significantly more 
complete contracts than the ones negotiated at the European headquarter in Models 3 and 5. 
Surprisingly though, this findings is reflected in shorter contract length as reported in Table 8. 
Finally, Table 9 shows that the Australian subsidiary has a statistically significant impact on 
the option to renegotiate when compared to the European headquarter. 
2.6 Discussion  
The key result of this study is the significant relationship between cultural distance and 
the level of contract completeness in Hypothesis 5a. The results indicate that the greater the 
cultural difference of the involved parties, the more complete the final contract. In Table 10, 
this relationship is explored in more detail. When looking at cultural differences along each 
score, I find that greater power distance differences and greater individuality differences 
between partners result in significantly more complete contracts. For the dimensions of 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, the differences between buyer and supplier’s cultural 
background does not have a significant effect.  
The finding that greater cultural distance leads to greater contract completeness adds to 
the existing literature and underscores previous findings in the field of negotiations that 
cultural distance increases the level of difficulty in the negotiation context (Brett, 2007) and 
translates into the final written contract. Even in times of ever increasing standardization, 
successful companies such as the Global Fortune 500 company from this study appear to 
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consider its supplier’s background when setting up the specifics of the transaction and the 
relationship. Although this finding is in line with expectations, this study provides empirical 
support as it had not been shown in the literature previously since studies in the field of culture 
and organizations are scarce (Kaufmann & Carter, 2006). The finding provides an additional 
incentive for companies in international relations to keep differences in nationalities in mind. 
These results are consistent across different models and specifications. As a robustness 
check, I used Saussier (2000) classification of contract completeness, but the overall results are 
consistant. I also ran the same set of models using a cultural distance index that includes the 
fifth Hofstede dimension of long term orientation. This reduced the sample size to 146 
observations but did not change the results. Similarly, I tested the effect on a subsample of the 
data (91 observations) using only the product category of raw materials as these contracts 
appear fairly similar and are related to one type of goods. The results are consistent with the 
findings from the complete dataset.  
Surprisingly, cultural distance also has a marginally significant but negative effect on 
the option to renegotiate the contract (H5c). Previous literature led to the hypothesis that greater 
distance within the dyads is associated with greater uncertainty in the relationship (Steensma et 
al., 2000) and, hence, as a consequence greater transaction cost. The finding of my study, 
therefore, contradicts expectations as the results show that participants are more inclined to 
renegotiate contract with partners from a more similar cultural background. I find no 
statistically significant effect of cultural distance on contract length (H5b).  
With respect to hypthesis 1 to 4, this study finds that some of the average Hofstede 
dimension scores significantly influence the level of contract completeness (H3a and H4a) and 
contract length (H2b), while none has a significant effect on the option to renegotiate the 
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contract. As expected, greater average masculinity scores are associated with longer contracts 
(H2b). The greater need for material possession and assertiveness increases partners need to 
incorporate more details in the contracts – making them longer – in order to prevent the other 
party from behaving opportunistically, hence, raising transaction cost.  
Surprisingly, the average individuality score has a negative effect on contract 
completeness (H3a). This indicates that as the partners in a relationship come from countries 
that are highly individualistic such as the United States of America and the Netherlands, they 
are likely to have a less complete contract than partners from countries such as Venezuela, 
South Korea and Thailand – these latter countries have more collectivistic societies with an 
emphasis on the group rather than the individual. This result can perhaps be attributed to the 
fact that although the dyads from collectivistic countries place emphasis on the group, they do 
not consider another firm as part of the collective but rather a competitor. Trust and a place in 
the relationship need to be earned by both parties over time. Hence, partners in a relationship 
bridge this period of getting acquainted with each other by setting up more complete contracts. 
On the other hand, firms from more individualistic countries might follow a code of ethics 
irrespective of the nationality of the partner organization. Although they stress their own 
achievements, society (and laws) still expect them to behave ethically. As such they might 
perceive less need to develop more complete contracts.  
Similarly, higher average uncertainty avoidance scores resulted in lower contract 
completeness (H4a). This finding is also unexpected. It appears that partners from countries 
such as China and Denmark – with relatively low uncertainty avoidance scores – have more 
complete contracts than partners from countries such as Argentina, Belgium or Japan. Part of 
the reason for this finding might be due to the way this dimension is measured originally by 
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Hofstede (1983b): in his study he asked participants their willingless to leave their current 
employment and their perception of breaking rules. Another possible explanation for this result 
could be that partners from countries with higher uncertainty scores only engage in 
relationships with partners that they trust in the first place requiring less need for more 
complete contracts once the relationship is established. Partners from low scoring countries, on 
the other hand, might be less descriminating when engaging in the business transcation but 
recognize the need in such a context to protect their business by having more complete 
contracts.  
This study found no statisically significant relationship between average power distance 
score (H1a) and average masculinity score (H2a) and contract completeness. Similary, no 
significant effect of average score of power distance (H1b), individuality (H2b) or uncertainty 
avoidance (H4b) on length of the contract is found nor any of the dimensions on the option to 
renegotiate the contract (H1c to H4c).  I therefore conclude that the average cultural dimensions 
appear to only have a very limited effect on the level of uncertainty and, hence, transaction cost 
in the contractual relationship. The findings demonstrate that although academia perceives to 
have a well-founded understanding of different cultures, their effects, influences and nuances 
need more thorough investigation. This study agrees with Kaufmann et al. (2006) that 
additional research on the effects of culture in inter-organizational relationships is needed.   
 The current study includes asset specificty and frequency to provide a complete 
assessment of the determinants of transaction cost. In line with previous studies, I find that 
higher asset specificity results in higher transaction cost which in this case means more 
complete contracts and a higher likelihood to have the option to renegotiate the contract. These 
findings are robust across all regression models for these two dependent variables. I do not find 
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a significant effect of asset specificity on contract length. Contrary to Williamson’s (1985) 
proposition, I do not find that frequency increases the level of transaction costs. Instead the 
results show – across all models – that as frequency increases, the level of contract 
completeness decreases, the lengths of the contract decreases and the option of renegotiation in 
the contract decreases. These findings are in line with Argyres and Begilow (2007), who 
proposed that in generic transactions the costs of sourcing on the market, even in frequent 
intervals, is less than the costs associated with internalizing production within the firm. As the 
current study looks at contractual data using a hybrid form of market structure rather than the 
decision of market versus hierarchy, the results are reasonable. After all, the firm has already 
decided to source in the market and the model controls for other effects such as asset 
specificity of the investment. More frequent interactions imply a better understanding of the 
market and the ability to judge situations in a consistent manner allowing Buyer to use its 
experience to reduce the level of contract completeness. 
The results show that contract completeness is the best measure of transaction cost in 
contracts of the three investigated. It is the most comprehensive of the measures and allows for 
a more nuanced study of the relationship between cultural differences and transaction cost. In 
this research, I used contract length as a simplier measure of contract completeness, however, 
the findings of this study lead to the conclusion that it is not a very sophisticated approximation 
and its predicting power is not aligned with the measure of contract completeness. Especially 
the Asian contracts demonstrate that the dyads include a variety of contract dimensions without 
significantly increasing the contract length. Finally, the findings of the option to renegotiate the 
contract provide results that suggest that more detailed studies into this variable are helpful in 
order to understand the negotiation of contracts between buyer and supplier.  
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2.5.3 Robustness Checks 
The main relationship investigated in this study is the impact of cultural differences on 
contract completeness. In the following, I discuss some robustness checks for these results. In 
the OLS regressions (Table 7), I checked for the general OLS assumptions. I found no 
statistically significant effect for multicollinearity (using VIF) or heteroscedasticity (using the 
Breusch-Pagan Cook-Weisberg test) for the relationship between contract completeness and 
culture. The residuals all are normal.  
As an additional robustness check of the results, I used Saussier’s contract 
completeness variable as available in this dataset (using the dimensions of buyer’s quantity 
flexibility, supplier’s fixed quantity, supplier’s default penalties, price and dispute resolution; 
excluding the dimension of buyer’s default penalties as they were not mentioned in any of the 
contracts). The results overall were the same as those reported in Table 6. This model, 
however, failed to find support for the relationship between asset specificity and Saussier’s 
contract completeness. 
2.5.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The data was gathered at a single European, Global Fortune 500 company: this is both a 
limitation as well as the strength of the study. On the one hand, using a single company to 
generalize the findings is problematic as each company faces different issues. As such, the 
findings from this study might only apply to Buyer company. However, Buyer as a Global 
Fortune 500 company has demonstrated its success by means of its adaptability and 
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responsiveness to the market. As a European company from a mid-sized country, from its 
origins, Buyer has been forced to source from and supply to markets outside its domestic 
context. It, hence, garnered great foreign experience unlike some of its North American 
counterparts that had a large domestic market to grow in initially. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the fact that the company is as successful as it is today is in part attributable to 
its ability to deal in an international context. The findings of this study are generalizable to 
some extent and can be used to derive guidelines for intercultural buyer-supplier interactions. 
However, additional research is needed that expands this study to a broader group of 
firms and industries and perhaps even a greater variety of countries. Furthermore, although the 
current study found an impact of culture and cultural distance on contract completeness, it does 
not provide insights into the specifics of the contracts. Future research needs to establish links 
between different aspects of contracts and their relationship to certain nationalities.  
2.7 Conclusion 
Using a unique data set, this study finds that cultural distance has an impact on 
contractual buyer supplier relationships. Providing robust results, the empirical analyses 
support that greater cultural distance between buyer and supplier leads to greater contract 
completeness. The measure of contract length as dependent variable does not provide great 
insights into the relationship between cultural differences and transaction cost. Surprisingly 
though, the study found that cultural difference does not impact the option to renegotiate as 
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In addition, this research investigated the impact of each cultural dimension in more 
detail and found some surprising results leading to the conclusion that additional research in 
the field of international buyer-supplier relationships is needed. The impact of culture is still 
not fully understood but the current study provided some new insights. Average individuality 
and uncertainty avoidance scores impacted the transaction costs – both having an unexpectedly 
negative relationship with the level of contract completeness, while average masculinity scores 
positively influence the physical length of the contract. 
These findings establish that culture in buyer-supplier relationships is important and 
managers need to be aware of its potential influences when engaging in international 
interactions. Different contract terms are applicable in different cultural settings. 
Understanding culture and its impact in intercultural contract design can make firms more 
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Chapter 3: The Impact of Cultural Differences on Negotiations 
3.1 Introduction 
In today’s global economy, it is important for businesses to be aware of cultural 
differences. As an increasing number of firms are dealing with buyers and suppliers abroad, 
many of them have realized the need to take different cultural traits into account when 
negotiating (i.e. Weiss, 2006). These differences influence people’s behavior and 
understanding of situations (Hofstede, 1980). Being aware of cultural differences can translate 
into better relationships between supply chain partners. Increased awareness of potential issues 
in a negotiation context allows firms to have more successful interactions in the long run 
(Adler et al., 1992) and helps them avoid misunderstandings. Furthermore, it can translate into 
more success in negotiations and, hence, result in cost savings and more competitive strategies. 
There is still both a business and academic need for better understanding “cross-cultural dyadic 
sales interactions” (Mintu-Wimsatt & Gassenheimer, 1996, p. 20) in order to effectively 
manage international interactions.  
In particular, drawing on Williamson’s (1975, 1985b, 1993) transaction cost economic 
theory, the current study investigates the impact of cultural differences and similarities on the 
negotiation dimension of opportunism. Opportunistic behavior occurs when participants in a 
relationship maximize their own utility at the expense of someone else’s. However, it is only 
likely to occur in situations where opportunism is not detected easily (Waldman & Jensen, 
2007). A negotiation context with participants from different countries provides such a 
scenario as it mimics the increased uncertainty. Studies have posited that negotiating parties in 
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intercultural negotiations are more likely not to fully understand how a partner will behave in a 
certain situation as it differs across countries (Bagozzi, Verbeke, & Gavino, 2003; Brett, 2007). 
This presents an opportunity for opportunistic behavior as one participant can use the existing 
uncertainty to disguise and manipulate a situation to her advantage. Also, firms and 
participants need to be aware of how negotiations are affected by similarities and differences in 
their cultural background (Graham et al., 1994). Culture is also likely to impact the relationship 
between different negotiation dimensions and the final outcome (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). 
Therefore, the current study investigates these issues by addressing several research questions:  
How does cultural distance effect international negotiations?  
What is the moderating effect of cultural differences on negotiations? 
This research contributes to the field of international negotiations in two ways. First, 
the study focuses on cultural differences. Literature that focuses on mixed cultural pairs in 
negotiations is relatively scarce (Brett, 2007; Brett & Okumura, 1998). However, in 
international negotiations, firms are faced with these kind of scenarios increasingly and, hence, 
require additional insights. Especially the relationship between culture and perceived 
opportunism and opportunistic behavior has not been studied in the context of intercultural 
negotiations before.  
Second, the study provides a better understanding of the impact of culture as a 
moderating factor. Although the impact of culture is often mentioned, literature that 
investigates the moderating effect is limited (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). Hence, the current study 
investigates the impact of culture on previously studied relationships between negotiation 
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dimensions and outcomes. When comparing dyads from different countries, the previously 
hypothesized relationships quite often are insignificant (Adler & Graham, 1987) or 
contradicting (Adler et al., 1992; vs. Graham et al., 1994). A moderating effect of culture 
would provide a potential explanation for these conflicting results in pervious studies. In 
addition, it makes partners in international supply chains aware of issues that can arise due to 
the differences in cultural background.  
The paper provides a brief overview about negotiations, culture and their relationship. 
Subsequently, hypotheses are derived that investigate both dimensions and outcomes of 
negotiations and their impact on culture. The next section provides a description of the 
experimental study, its design and participants. Next, section 5 reports the results and is 
followed by the discussion in section 6. This chapter closes with a brief conclusion and 
potential limitations of the study.  
3.2 Theoretical Background  
 This section the concepts of negotiations and culture are discussed, in general, and I 
specifically focus on low and high context cultures. Subsequently, the hypotheses are 
developed and the model to be analyzed is introduced. 
3.2.1 Negotiations 
Negotiations refer to the interaction between two or more parties with the ultimate goal 
of achieving a mutually beneficial outcome (Evans & Beltramini, 1987). During the process of 
negotiations, the participants are exposed to the often contradicting elements of individualistic 
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goals as well as a need for cooperation in order to resolve the arising conflict and arrive at the 
desired outcome (Graham et al., 1994). According to Brett (2007), a negotiation always 
involves some level of interdependence between the involved parties. 
The final successful outcome of a negotiation is a deal. Deals can be either distributive 
or integrative. In distributive deals (also referred to as competitive, zero-sum or win-lose), the 
involved parties argue along a single issue or dimension. The relationship between the pay-off 
between partners is linear implying that a win for one party involves a proportional loss for the 
other party. Haggling over a single product in a market is an example of this kind of 
negotiation. The seller offers the good at a high price, the buyer counters with a low price and 
the two will eventually seal the deal if the overall outcome for both of them leaves them better 
off than without the deal. However, any gain by the buyer results in a proportional reduction in 
price to the seller as there is a “fixed pie of resources” (Brett, 2007, p. 2). 
Integrative deals (also referred to as coordinative) arise if the process of negotiation 
actually increases the joint utility (profit pie), potentially allowing both seller and buyer a 
better outcome and creating a win-win situation (Brett, 2007; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Generally, 
in integrative deals multiple trade-offs are considered simultaneously. The participants 
approach issues as challenges to which they find a solution while keeping their own goals and 
aspirations in mind. This implies high levels of flexibility and at times out-of-the-box-thinking 
while being steadfast at the same time. It requires some extent of free flow of information from 
all sides that is truthful in order to reach a solution that benefits all involved parties (Pruitt & 
Lewis, 1975). A simple example is the sale of a fridge (in Europe). Refrigerators contain 
environmentally harmful substances and, hence, need to be disposed off at special dumping 
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sites at a cost. By offering to take back the customer’s old fridge when delivering the new 
fridge, the customer might be more inclined to purchase at this seller. The seller gains by 
making the sale, while the buyer reduces his cost of transporting and disposing the old fridge. 
In general, in integrative deals, participants negotiate multiple issues at the same time (here: 
fridge sale, disposal of old fridge). They share information and are interested in solving the 
problem in a mutually beneficial way.  
3.2.1.1 Negotiation Dimensions and Outcomes 
Negotiations are characterized by different dimensions and outcomes. It is very difficult 
to observe negotiations in a real life business context. Hence, the extent to which potential 
dimensions can be investigated is limited (Graham et al., 1994). Therefore, research has 
focused on experimental studies also referred to as negotiation simulations. Several studies 
used joint profits as their main dependent variable in dyadic negotiations (Clopton, 1984; 
Graham et al., 1994; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Starting in the 1980s, studies began using post-
experiment surveys to derive additional dependent variables such as satisfaction and trust 
(Dwyer & Walker, 1981; Graham et al., 1994; Kaufmann & O'Neill, 2007). 
Joint Profits – Joint profit is a measure of economic rewards of the negotiation. The 
measure is defined as the profits that both partners combined receive (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). 
Profits (both individual and joint) are the most common measure of negotiation outcome in 
experimental research (Adler et al., 1992; Dwyer & Walker, 1981; Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). In a 
dyadic relationship, it allows researchers to measure the monetary extent of the integrative deal 
across all participants irrespective of individual bargaining powers (Clopton, 1984). The 
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involved parties are required to communicate their wishes and needs beyond a simple price 
trade-off in an integrative deal. Joint profits in this context provide an objective performance 
measure. Furthermore, even as participants focus on their individual profits in the negotiation, 
joint profits is an adequate reflection of both participants’, maximized individual profits. 
Satisfaction – Satisfaction is defined “as a positive affective state resulting from the 
appraisal of all aspects of a firm’s working relationship with another firm” (Anderson & Narus, 
1984, p. 66; Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1999, p. 224). It is another dimension to be 
considered when negotiating, especially in integrative deals, as satisfaction relates to both 
monetary and non-monetary compensation (Gassenheimer, Calantone, Schmitz, & 
Robicheaux, 1994). Zhao and Stank (2003) state satisfaction is a “cumulative evaluation based 
on the total […] experience” (162). Hence, participants in a negotiation can strive for other 
objectives than pure immediate economic gains. For example, a firm might be willing to agree 
to a business deal that does not provide it with any profit knowing this will create goodwill for 
future dealings. Hence, at times negotiators perceive a deal as a win-win situation although the 
monetary payoff at that particular moment does not reflect it perfectly.  
 In terms of economic satisfaction, a partner in a negotiation context is satisfied if 
her/his receipts, in terms of profits, as well as her/his sales volume and/or margins align with 
her/his expectations in terms of goal attainment (Geyskens et al., 1999). This aspect of 
satisfaction is present only after closing the negotiation. Non-economic (or social) satisfaction, 
on the other hand, refers to “the psychosocial aspects of [a] relationship, in that interactions 
with the exchange partner are fulfilling, gratifying, and facile” (Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000, 
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p. 13). It’s initial perception usually develops in the early stages of a relationship (Geyskens & 
Steenkamp, 2000) and is adjusted throughout the process. 
Trust – Trust is an important element of business dealings in general and negotiations 
in particular. “Trust is defined as a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one 
has confidence” (Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992, p. 315). Trust is only required in 
situations of uncertainty and does not rely primarily on legal agreements (Kaufmann & Carter, 
2006). However, clear definition and expectation help coordinate both negotiations as well as 
partnerships, allowing for trust to build. The trusting partner assumes that her partner will act 
in good faith (in a manner that does not hurt the trustor), fulfill promises and obligations, and 
generally behave as agreed upon (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Corsten & Felde, 2005). Trust 
develops due to a combination of the following: past experiences, the understanding of the 
involved parties, as well as reliable role performance and professional image (credentials) 
(Rinehart, Eckert, Handfield, Page, & Atkin, 2004).  
Trust is of importance to negotiations as negotiators reach cooperative goals faster if it 
is present (Ueltschy et al., 2007). Furthermore, trust has been found to allow partners to reduce 
expenditures related to controls against opportunistic behavior (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996) 
resulting in lower purchasing costs in buyer-supplier relationship (Corsten & Felde, 2005). In 
addition, higher level of trust have been found to result in longer relationships (Kaufmann & 
Carter, 2006). Finally, a minimal level of trust is a prerequisite for negotiators to move from 
pure distributive to integrative deals as the exchange of information requires trust (Pruitt & 
Lewis, 1975).  
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Opportunism – A firm displays opportunistic behavior when it is “self-interest seeking 
with guile” (Williamson, 1993, p. 458). Opportunism can take on many forms: one extreme is 
the example of two partners in a joint venture that bring different assets to the table. One 
partner contributes the knowledge of technology while the other has insights into a specific 
market. After getting a good understanding of the underlying technology, the second partner 
leaves the joint venture and develops a similar product in the same market. This partner 
exploited the first company and the relationship to gain new technological knowledge. 
It is almost impossible to foresee at the beginning of a relationship, whether the 
partners are likely to behave opportunistically or not (Tangpong & Ro, 2009). In order to 
protect themselves, firms develop contracts trying to foresee any major issues that might 
introduce opportunism into the relationship. However, it is impractical and next to impossible 
as it is costly and time consuming to develop a contract that covers every eventuality (i.e., 
Williamson, 1979; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). Therefore, the current study wants to provide 
insights into opportunistic behavior – an issue that has not received much attention. This 
research investigates both the perceived level of opportunism as well as the presence of actual 
opportunistic behavior. 
3.2.2 Culture and Cultural Differences 
Culture provides characteristics of identification of and for members of a (social) group 
(i.e., Brett, 2007; Rivers & Lytle, 2007). It manifests itself in shared values, beliefs, and traits, 
providing a set of rules and guidelines to its members to interpret people, their behavior and 
situations (Brett & Okumura, 1998; Hofstede, 1985). The cultural characteristics provide 
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grounds for the interpretation of actions within a context (Rivers & Lytle, 2007). In research, 
culture has often been operationalized as  “culture of shared value” (Rivers & Lytle, 2007, p. 3) 
using dimensions such as uncertainty avoidance or masculinity (defined by Hofstede, 1983b) 
or high versus low context cultures (Hall, 1976) to observe and assess the behavior of 
participants. 
Negotiations are often conducted in an international context – between partners from 
different cultural backgrounds as today’s economy is becoming more and more interdependent. 
Production, procurement and sales span the entire world requiring businesses to conduct their 
negotiations with both domestic and foreign partners. Although negotiations have been studied 
extensively in the literature, these research studies have mainly been conducted in a Western 
context (Triandis, 1994). According to Gelfand and Dyer (2000) there is a distinctive need to 
elaborate the current research in this field.  
Participants from different cultural backgrounds pose challenges to negotiators in an 
international context (Adair & Brett, 2005). Cultural differences reflect differences in (groups 
of) people and societies across countries and nationalities. They are manifested in “1. 
Language and language behavior; 2. Non-verbal behavior; 3. Values; 4. Pattern of thought” 
(Adler & Graham, 1989, p. 519). While the language barrier is an obvious obstacle, the latter 
points are more difficult to observe and integrate (understanding the reasoning of someone 
from the same cultural background is difficult as it is, understanding those of a person from a 
different upbringing and value-system is significantly more difficult). Non-verbal 
communication, expectations, and context interpretations influence intercultural relationships 
and hence negotiations (Triandis, 2000). Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999) found that the 
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different cultural background resulted in different judgment errors in negotiations. Hence, the 
different cultural backgrounds of the negotiating parties are expected to increase the potential 
of pitfalls (Brett & Okumura, 1998). Participants are required to find a mutual agreement to the 
issue of negotiation while avoiding misunderstanding of various natures. However, the 
previous research focused on comparisons of dyads from different cultural backgrounds (Adler 
et al., 1992; Graham et al., 1994) did not address the fundamental issue of international 
negotiations. In the following, this paper investigates the potential impact of cultural 
differences on negotiation (intercultural negotiations) in detail. Please refer to Figure 3 for a 
graphic depiction of the effect of culture on negotiation dimensions and outcomes. 
3.3 Hypotheses  
3.3.1 Direct Effects of Intercultural Negotiations 
The first hypothesis approaches the issue of cultural differences and their effect on 
negotiation outcomes as depicted in Figure 3. The experiment consists of two groups: those 
with a similar cultural background and those from different countries. Each participant is 
classified by his national culture, controlling for the time spent abroad. When possible, 
participants are matched a priori according to their nationality into these two groups. The first 
outcome investigated is joint profits, a pure economic perspective. Second, the study focuses 
on satisfaction, a more subjective outcome dimension. The third and forth dimensions, 
opportunism and trust, respectively, are aspects of negotiations. Differences in cultural 
backgrounds are expected to influence these dimensions and outcomes. Each dimension is 
defined followed by theoretical arguments to position the hypothesis. 
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Figure 3: Direct effect of intercultural negotiations 
Joint profits – Similar cultural backgrounds allow for a better understanding and 
assessment of the other participant and his/her goals (Mathews, Wilson, & Monoky, 1972). 
While participants from countries such as Germany and the United States of America, where 
the cultural background fosters a focus on personal benefits, focus on their own gains, 
participants from countries such as Japan or Latin America (Hofstede, 1983b) tend to 
emphasize “maintaining relatedness, fitting in with others, and promoting other’s goals, which 
directs cognitions to the relationship itself, and on the interests of others with whom one is 
related” (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999, p. 263). Brett and Okumura (1998) found that 
similarity has affected the degree of cooperation between participants resulting in higher 
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profits. Therefore, as the current study uses an integrative profit scheme, I propose that 
negotiations between partners from the similar cultural background results in higher overall 
monetary compensation (joint profits) than negotiations between partners from different 
context cultural backgrounds.  
H1a: Bargaining dyads with cultural differences will realize lower profits than 
bargaining dyads from the same background.  
Satisfaction – Satisfaction as a negotiation outcome measure is dependent upon 
participants’ expectations. As these expectations differ across societies, the participants in 
intercultural negotiation are facing more challenges in their relationship than those from 
similar cultural backgrounds. Anderson and Narus (1990) state that “satisfaction is a focal 
consequence of working partnerships” (p. 46). As discussed earlier, cultural differences 
enhances the obstacles faced by participants to develop such a working relationship. 
Participants from the same cultural background, ceteris paribus, are likely to reach an 
agreement more easily and as such derive higher level of satisfaction from their deal (Geringer 
& Hebert, 1991). The current research, hence, proposes that partners from different cultural 
backgrounds feel less satisfied than those from the same cultural background. 
H1b: Bargaining dyads with cultural differences will realize lower perceived levels of 
satisfaction than bargaining dyads from the same background. 
Trust – Trust is based on “cultural-ethic similarity” (Rinehart et al., 2004, p. 30). 
Similar cultural backgrounds allow for a similar understanding of expectations and rules 
underlying the negotiation. As an initial categorization of trustworthiness of a partner is formed 
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early in a negotiation process (Geyskens et al., 1999), similar cultural background allow for 
immediate classification and assessment of the partner and, hence, facilitates trust building. 
Such assessments for a partner from a different cultural background require additional 
information – a costly process both in terms of time and money commitment. Furthermore, 
negative previous experiences and the resulting prejudices can aggravate the trust building 
process. While a negative experience with a partner from the same cultural background is 
likely to be attributed to personal and company specific traits and issues, a similar situation 
with a partner from a different country is easily interpreted as national flaws. As such, the 
study expects that trust is lower in mixed-context culture relationships than in those with 
partners from the same cultural background.  
H1c: Bargaining dyads with cultural differences will realize lower perceived levels of 
trust than bargaining dyads from the same background. 
Opportunism – Opportunistic behavior is more likely in situation of information 
asymmetry and high uncertainty (Williamson, 1993). In intercultural negotiations, participants 
are faced not only with the situation of negotiating a deal but also with traits, beliefs and 
behaviors that differ from their own (Brett, 2007). Hence, when dealing with partners from a 
different cultural background, complexity and uncertainty of a negotiation increases (Mintu-
Wimsatt & Gassenheimer, 2000). Similarly, participants dealing with partners from their own 
culture are more aware of the expectations these partners put forward. The potential 
ramifications of opportunistic behavior are more apparent. The current study, therefore, 
expects that negotiating participants from different cultural backgrounds are more likely to 
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expect and act opportunistically than those participants dealing with partners from their own 
cultural background. 
H1d: Bargaining dyads with cultural differences will realize higher perceived levels of 
opportunism than bargaining dyads from the same background. 
H1e: Bargaining dyads with cultural differences will realize actual opportunistic 
behavior more often than bargaining dyads from the same background. 
3.3.2 Moderating Effects of Culture in Negotiations 
The second aspect of this study is the investigation of the moderating effect of culture 
on the relationship of certain negotiation dimensions and the outcome of joint profits. Gelfand 
and Dyer (2000) posit that research is needed to investigate the moderating effect of culture. In 
the following, this study hypothesizes the direct effect of several negotiation dimensions 
followed by the indirect effect culture has on each. Figure 4 provides a graphic depiction of 
this aspect of the study.   
Satisfaction – Customer satisfaction is often regarded as an antecedent of customer 
loyalty (Ribbink, Riel, Liljander, & Streukens, 2004; Stank, Goldsby, Vickery, & Savitskie, 
2003) and profits (Anderson, Fornell, & Rust, 1997; Homburg, Wieseke, & Hoyer, 2009). 
Research has shown that customer satisfaction lead to more purchases (Anderson & Fornell, 
2004). Similarly, studies in the field of international joint ventures have found that greater 
parent company satisfaction resulted in higher performance of the joint venture (Geringer & 
Hebert, 1991). Although previous studies have used satisfaction in combination with profits as 
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a negotiation performance outcome (Graham et al., 1994), the current study proposes that 
satisfaction is also an antecedent of joint profits in the context of negotiations: Greater levels of 
satisfaction lead to higher joint profits in negotiations.  
 
Figure 4: Moderating effect of culture 
Alternative perspectives exist on the derivation of satisfaction based on the underlying 
cultural context. On the one hand, countries that place a great emphasis on profits and 
monetary compensation like the U.S.A. associate higher profit levels with a feeling of 
achievement (Hofstede, 1983b). In Japan, on the other hand, a country that places a higher 
value on the relationship and its long-term prospects (Brett & Okumura, 1998), satisfaction is 
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likely to be derived from various dimensions and the effect of joint profits is less pronounced. 
This likely translates into additional friction between partners in negotiations when they 
originate from different backgrounds. Geringer et al. (1991) found that cultural differences 
between partners in joint ventures led to lower correlations between joint venture parents’ 
satisfaction and the joint venture’s performance. Following this line of argument, the current 
study proposes that culture moderates the effect of perceived level of satisfaction on joint 
profits in negotiations.  
H2: Cultural difference within bargaining dyads lead to a weaker effect of perceived 
level of satisfaction on joint profits than in bargaining dyads from similar cultural 
backgrounds. 
Trust – Trust is an integral part of negotiations (Schurr & Ozanne, 1985) and essential 
for constructive dialogue between the involved parties (Pruitt, 1981). Trust in the partner and, 
hence, in the relationship or negotiation influences joint profits (Langerak, 2001). It has been 
suggested that trust enables participants in relationships to strive for integrative deals in which 
the mutual gains outweigh their individual profits (Anderson & Narus, 1990). Mohr and 
Spekman (1994) found statistical significance for a positive association of trust and 
(satisfaction of) profits.  
Curall and Inkpen (2002) stressed that there is a need for a better understanding of 
culture in the context of trust. Ueltschy et al. (2007) found differences in the perception of the 
importance of trust by supply chain partners from a high context culture as opposed to those 
from a low context culture. Combining this argument with the expected positive relationship 
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between trust and joint profits, this study posits that culture moderates the effect that perceived 
level of trust has on joint profits.  
H3: Cultural difference within bargaining dyads lead to a weaker effect of perceived 
level of trust on joint profits than in bargaining dyads from similar cultural backgrounds.  
Opportunism – Opportunism, or the threat thereof, implies systematic hazards to the 
relationship (Williamson, 1993). Participants in negotiation that expect their partners to behave 
opportunistically need to hedge as a means to deal with the introduced uncertainty. These 
participants are faced with three options: 1) They can choose not to continue the negotiation 
with the current partner but in certain situations that is infeasible; 2) They can choose to 
develop a contract that controls every potential hazard that might arise (Williamson, 1993). 
This option is rather costly, both in terms of time and money, and often unrealistic; 3) The final 
option implies a monetary trade-off. Similar to the problem of lemon in the secondary car 
market, the threat of cars that will just be able to drive off the lot but die three weeks later 
reduces the price of all cars, good or bad (Akerlof, 1970). This last option is the most 
applicable scenario in the case at hand and, hence, I expect that greater perceived levels of 
opportunism lead to greater joint profits.  
Different cultural backgrounds results in varying approaches to understanding self and 
group interests (Brett, 2007; Hall, 1976; Hofstede, 1983a). We extend this argument into the 
context of opportunism and its effect on profits. Depending on the cultural background, 
opportunism is perceived as more or less acceptable in society: i.e., negotiators from low 
context cultures are more likely to take actions to protect themselves (Lee, Yang, & Graham, 
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2006). Therefore, this research proposes that culture influences the effect of opportunism on 
joint profits.  
H4: Cultural difference within bargaining dyads lead to a weaker effect of perceived 
levels of opportunism on joint profits than in bargaining dyads from similar cultural 
backgrounds. 
3.4 Methodology 
To pre-test the experimental design for validity of constructs, a trial was run in an 
undergraduate class: 23 undergraduates and 1 Ph.D. student participated during this in-class 
session. The analysis of this data resulted in good factors. The session resulted in the 
adjustment of the time from for the complete experiment: Originally I had estimated the time 
for the experiment for 60 minutes. After the test run, I reduced the time frame to 40 minutes as 
participants reached agreements quicker. 
3.4.1 Subjects  
 For the current study, I attempted to recruit 100 students (50 pairs) to participate in the 
experiment. I only approached graduate students in the business school, both M.B.A. and Ph.D. 
students, as these participants are more likely to have previous work experience and, hence, 
mimic actual management behavior. In addition, MBA students are the managers of the future 
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 Participants were recruited from a pool of 250 full-time MBA students. Two waves of 
email invitations were sent out to the students. In addition, two professors made verbal 
announcements in their classes: one in a first year core MBA class and the other in an elective 
attended by both first and second year MBA students. In addition, about 100 Ph.D. students 
from the same university’s business school were invited by email to take part in the 
experiment. As compensation, lunch was offered as well as prizes for the best performances 
during the experiment. In three sessions, 90 students participated in the experiment. 80 of the 
90 students were recruited from the first year MBA class, 5 were second year MBA students 
and 5 were Ph.D. students.  
3.4.2 Task 
The data is collected using a negotiation simulation of buyer-seller dyads. The 
negotiation game used by Pruitt and Lewis (1975) is expanded using Carter and Stevens’ 
(2007) experiment as a guideline. The original simulation required a buyer and a seller to 
negotiate the prices of three different products (Alpha, Beta, and Gamma). The pay-offs are 
asymmetrically distributed allowing participants to gain higher profits if they derive an 
integrative deal. For example, for product Alpha, the seller can achieve a higher pay-off than 
the buyer. The pay-off scheme for product Beta is distributive: a gain for one party results in a 
proportional loss for the other parties. For product Gamma, the buyer can achieve a higher pay-
off. In the ideal negotiation deal, the seller can negotiate higher overall profit by accepting a 
lower price (and slightly lower profits) on product Gamma in favor for a higher price (and 
significantly higher profit) for product Alpha (and vice versa for the seller): a mutually 
profitable trade-off. These profit trade offs are detailed in Table 11. 
  
  
   
 80 
In addition, the current study introduces two levels of product quality (high Qh and low 
Ql). The buyer has no means to control the level of quality upon receipt, however, has a 
preference for high quality goods. Profit schemes differ according to the delivered quality (see 
Table 11). The participant enacting the buyer has to make the decision as to whether s/he trusts 
the seller to deliver the product as promised or to negotiate prices for the low quality product. 
The seller in this set-up has the option to negotiate a price for the high quality good but to 
deliver low quality – significantly increasing his/her profits. As shown in Table 11, prices are 
listed as letters ranging from A to N and are for the specified number of units. The profit 
column represents the profit the company will make at this particular price.  
3.4.3 Procedure 
Subjects are invited to participate in a half-hour experiment that is entirely voluntary. 
After a short introduction to the experiment (refer to Appendix C), they are paired up in teams 
of two (dyad). When possible, participants are assigned to mixed or same cultural background 
teams in order to create sufficient variance in the data.5 The subjects are then randomly 
assigned the role of buyer and seller within each dyad. Role-appropriate instruction sheets are 
given out that include a price list and associated profits for each product as depicted in Table 
11 (please refer to Appendices A and B for the complete experiment information set for buyer 
and seller respectively). The instructions also contain background information about the 
company participants are asked to represent and the number of products they are to acquire. 
The subjects spend 10 minutes studying the material and developing a negotiating strategy. 
They are informed that they can use part or all of the information on the instruction sheets to 
                                                
5 This also reduced the potential of confounding the results due to previously formed friendships. 
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develop their arguments for the negotiation. Participants are unaware of their partners’ pay-off 
scheme and explicitly asked not to share the information until after they finished the 
experiment and the questionnaire. Next, the pairs start the negotiation process. 
Table 11: Price-profits for buyer and seller 
Seller           
Alpha price per 1000 units Beta price per 1000 units Gamma price per 1000 units 
           
  Profits    Profits    Profits 
Price High Low  Price High Low  Price High Low 
  Quality    Quality    Quality 
A $2,000  $3,250   A $1,200  $1,950   A $800  $1,300  
B $1,750  $3,000   B $1,050  $1,800   B $700  $1,200  
C $1,500  $2,750   C $900  $1,650   C $600  $1,100  
D $1,250  $2,500   D $750  $1,500   D $500  $1,000  
E $1,000  $2,250   E $600  $1,350   E $400  $900  
F $750  $2,000   F $450  $1,200   F $300  $800  
G $500  $1,750   G $300  $1,050   G $200  $700  
H $250  $1,500   H $150  $900   H $100  $600  
I $0  $1,250   I $0  $750   I $0  $500  
J -$250 $1,000   J -$150 $600   J -$100 $400  
K -$500 $750   K -$300 $450   K -$200 $300  
L -$750 $500   L -$450 $300   L -$300 $200  
M -$1,000 $250   M -$600 $150   M -$400 $100  
N -$1,250 $0   N -$750 $0   N -$500 $0  
           
Buyer           
Alpha price per 1000 units Beta price per 1000 units Gamma price per 1000 units 
           
  Profits    Profits    Profits 
Price High Low  Price High Low  Price High Low 
  Quality    Quality    Quality 
A $0  -$500  A $0  -$750  A $0  -$1,250 
B $100  -$400  B $150  -$600  B $250  -$1,000 
C $200  -$300  C $300  -$450  C $500  -$750 
D $300  -$200  D $450  -$300  D $750  -$500 
E $400  -$100  E $600  -$150  E $1,000  -$250 
F $500  $0   F $750  $0   F $1,250  $0  
G $600  $100   G $900  $150   G $1,500  $250  
H $700  $200   H $1,050  $300   H $1,750  $500  
I $800  $300   I $1,200  $450   I $2,000  $750  
J $900  $400   J $1,350  $600   J $2,250  $1,000  
K $1,000  $500   K $1,500  $750   K $2,500  $1,250  
L $1,100  $600   L $1,650  $900   L $2,750  $1,500  
M $1,200  $700   M $1,800  $1,050   M $3,000  $1,750  
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Subsequent to the negotiation, the students are asked to fill out a three-page 
questionnaire (please refer to Appendices A and B). The questionnaire consists of two parts: 
the first part contained questions regarding the experiment, their feelings of trust and 
satisfaction. In the second part, participants were asked to provide personal background 
information. In order to introduce an incentive for participants to strive for the highest possible 
outcome, they can earn prizes depending on their performance in the negotiation. 
3.4.4 Variables 
Culture – Culture, the main independent variable, is measured by noting the nationality 
(‘birth country nationality’) of the participants. Hall’s (1976) distinction between high and low 
context culture is used to differentiate nationalities. Hall’s distinction is more appropriate in the 
current setting, as his discrete measures can be tested more easily in experimental settings than 
Hofstede’s (1983b) cultural dimensions that are measured along a continuous scale (Brett, 
2007). Participants are assigned to pairs according to their classification into high or low 
context cultures. The study at hand tests two different pairings: same-context culture 
participants and mixed-context culture participants. 
Profit – Joint and individual profits are measured directly during the experiment. 
Individual profits are based on the performance of each individual across all three products. 
Joint profits, on the other hand, are calculated based on the profits of both buyer and seller 
across all three products. As participants are asked to maximize their individual profits, these 
are reflected in joint profits. Profits by (individual) product are an inappropriate outcome 
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measure as the experiment is design asymmetrical implying that higher profits for one product 
can be used to make concessions in the price of another, potentially less profitable product. 
This increases the incentive for participants to actively engage in the negotiation and not just 
choose a middle ground.  
Both individual and joint profits fall into three categories, namely, agreed, expected and 
actual (realized) profits. Agreed profits are based on the negotiated prices and quality level 
across all three products. Expected profits are what the buyer expected to earn. Buyers are 
asked to indicate the quality level they expect the seller to deliver. Although the buyer 
negotiated certain price-quality ratios, those in dyads that agreed to high quality face the risk of 
a potentially cheating (not truthfully behaving) partner. In a limited number of instances, the 
buyer expected low quality when s/he had bargained for high quality. In these circumstances, 
expected profits for the buyer is lower than agreed profits. Actual (or realized) profits are 
computed by taking into account the quality delivered by the seller. On the seller side, actual 
and expected profits are the same, but they may differ for the buyer. Again, these profits are 
across all three products.  
Satisfaction – Perceived level of satisfaction is measured during the follow-up 
interview. The study uses a 4-item scale developed by Graham, Mintu et al. (1994). 
Participants are asked to rate the items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from satisfied (1) to 
dissatisfied (5). For analysis purposes and ease of interpretation, I reversed the scaling of this 
variable in the latter part of this study. 
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Trust – Perceived level of trust is measured in the follow-up interview using a 5-item 
scale developed by Hill et al (2009). This scale is supplemented by the trust scale of Spake and 
Bishop (2009). Participants are asked to rate each item on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 
completely agree (1) to completely disagree (5). Again, to facilitate the interpretation of the 
results, the scales are reversed. 
Opportunism – Perceived level of opportunism (perceived opportunism) is measured in 
the follow-up interview using a 4-item scale developed by Graham, Mintu et al. (1994). This 
measure looks at the generic perception of how well the partner is willing to make concessions 
in the negotiation. As a negotiation is ideally a-give-and-take, both buyer and seller can target a 
mutually beneficial agreement or just follow their own agenda with a focus on self-interest 
irrespective of their partners’ demands. Hence, this measure applies to both the buyer and the 
seller (see Table 19).  
In addition, I measure buyer’s expectation of his/her partner’s potentially opportunistic 
behavior (expected opportunism). Finally, opportunistic behavior (by the seller) is directly 
observed during the experiment. Assuming the dyad negotiated the sale of at least one high 
quality product, the seller has the chance to ‘cheat’ by delivering low quality instead of high 
quality and, thereby, increase her/his individual profits.  
Controls – The survey collects control variables for gender, date of birth and time spent 
outside of the USA. 
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3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Description of the Data 
 Participants: In three sessions, 90 students participated in the experiment. 80 students 
were participants from the first year MBA class, 5 were second year MBA students and 5 were 
Ph.D. students. The first session had 34 and the second 44 first year MBA students that took 
part the experiment. The third session consisted of a mix of students form the three subject 
pool groups. Two observations were removed from the final data set due to contradicting data6. 
The final data set consisted of 88 observations, the equivalent of 44 dyads.  
 Participants were ask that the experiment would take between 30 to 40 minutes. 
However, those who needed it would be give additional time. Nobody participating in the 
experiment requested additional time and every dyad reached a mutual agreement within the 
allotted time.  
 Cultural background: Overall, 65.9% of subjects were US citizen at the time of the 
experiment, while 34% were foreigners. This split is very similar in both buyer (68% versus 
32%) and seller (64% versus 36%) group. The ratio is slightly different when looking at the 
citizenship at birth: 59% were born U.S. Americans; 61% in the buyer and 57% in the seller 
group. From those born abroad, the majority (25 out of 36) are from Asia (12 from East Asia – 
China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Thailand, Singapore – and 13 from India/Pakistan). The rest was 
born in countries across the world (5 South Americans, 2 from the Arabian Peninsula, 1 
                                                
6 Buyer and seller reported no or differing quality levels for agreed quality level in negotiation. As such, no valid 
derivation of opportunistic behavior, expected opportunistic behavior, etc., can be derived. 
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African, 1 Canadian, 1 Caribbean and 1 European). 51% of all dyads are between partners of 
different cultural background, meaning that in the majority of cases one partner is from a high 
context culture like Asia or South America while the other partner is from a low context 
culture like the USA or Northern Europe.  
 Data was collected from 44 dyads. 19 of these were between same context culture teams. 
This implies that the participants were from a low context culture like the US, northern Europe 
or Israel (Brett, 2007). In 17 of these dyads, both participants were from low context cultures 
(e.g. U.S.-U.S. or U.S.-U.K.), while in two, both participants originated from high context 
cultures (e.g. India-India, China-Taiwan). 25 of the formed dyads were in mixed-context 
culture pairs. This implies that the participants in these teams came from one low context 
culture like the U.S. and one high context culture like China, India, South America or the 
Arabic peninsula (except Israel) (Brett, 2007).  
Table 12: Gender by culture 
  Same Mixed Total 
  Culture   
Male 9 10% 14 16% 23 26% 
Buyer 
Female 10 11% 11 13% 21 24% 
Male 14 16% 16 18% 30 34% 
Supplier 
Female 5 6% 9 10% 14 16% 
Total (individual) 38 43% 50 57% 88 100.00 
Total (dyad) 19  25  44  
 
 Table 12 displays the distribution between male and female participants for both buyer 
and seller by context culture groups: 53 (60%) participants were male, 35 (40%) female. In the 
buyer group, 23 were male (21 female), while in the seller group 30 participants were male (14 
female). In case of the buyer, nine male individuals were in same-context culture dyads and 14 
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in mixed-culture dyads, while ten and eleven women, respectively. In case of the seller, 14 
male were in same- and 16 in mixed-context culture dyads compared to five and nine women, 
respectively.  
Level of quality: Table 13 displays the distribution between quality level and same- 
versus mixed-context cultures: about 89% (39 of 44 dyads) of the participants negotiated the 
sale of at least 1 high quality product and 11% (5 of 44 dyads) negotiated the sale of only low 
quality products. On average, the dyads negotiated prices for 1.93 high quality and, hence, 1.07 
low quality goods in each negotiation. Table 14 provides a more detailed overview of the 
different numbers of high quality negotiated. As can be observed, only eight dyads negotiated 
the sale of only one high quality product. The vast majority, 31 out of 44 or 70.5%, negotiated 
prices for two or more high quality products. 
Table 13: Quality level by culture  
 Same Mixed Total 
 Context Culture  
At least 1 high quality product 17 39% 22 50% 39 89% 
Only low quality products 2 5% 3 7% 5 11% 
Total (dyad) 19 43% 25 57% 44 100% 
  
Table 14: Distribution of negotiated quality  
Product N Percentage 
Low quality 5 11% 
1 high quality 8 18% 
2 high quality 16 36% 
All high quality 15 34% 
Total (dyad) 44 100% 
 
 Table 15 shows that 8 out of 10 participants negotiating the sale of only low quality are 
male. This distribution is even more apparent on the buyer side. Every buyer in dyads who 
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chose only low quality goods is male. Citizenship and citizenship at birth do not impact the 
choice of high versus low quality goods: 30% of U.S. citizen chose low quality goods as 
opposed to 35% who negotiated the sale of at least one high quality product. 
Table 15: Gender by negotiated quality of products 
  At least 1 high Only low 
  quality product(s) Total 
Male 18 23% 5 50% 23 26% 
Buyer Female 21 27% 0 0% 21 24% 
Male 27 35% 3 30% 30 34% 
Seller Female 12 15% 2 20% 14 16% 
 Total (individual) 78 100% 10 100% 88 100% 
 
 Information asymmetry (opportunistic behavior): In the case of high quality products, 
there is the option for the seller to behave opportunistically (cheat) by delivering a product in 
low quality although the dyad agreed on high quality during the negotiation. I measured both 
the buyer’s expectation that the seller cheats (expected opportunistic behavior) as well as the 
actual (seller’s) opportunistic behavior. 18% of the buyers expected the seller to deliver lower 
than agreed quality while 28% of the sellers actually cheated. In four cases (9% of all buyers), 
the buyer correctly predicted the outcome, meaning that the buyer expected the seller to deliver 
low quality although high quality was negotiated and the seller delivered low quality. 
However, in three cases (7%), the buyer suspected the seller to cheat when s/he performed as 
promised and delivered high quality. Finally, in seven instances (16%), the buyer was 
unsuspecting of the seller’s intention to cheat. 
 In terms of honest behavior, the split between same- versus mixed-context culture is 
evenly distributed. However, Table 16 shows that in the majority of cases (73%), cheating 
  
  
   
 89 
occurred in mixed-context culture dyads rather than same context culture. Investigating the 
split between U.S. national versus foreigners, I find that 73% of sellers that behave 
opportunistically (cheated) are U.S. citizens while 56% of them were born U.S. citizens. In 28 
instances (64% of all sellers, 72% of sellers in dyads with high quality product negotiations), 
the seller delivered high quality when promised. 68% of these are male, 61% are U.S. citizen 
and 57% were born U.S. citizen. Furthermore, Table 17 shows that of the 11 sellers who 
cheated, 73% are male. Overall, in cases where the seller behaves opportunistically, the 
number of high quality products negotiated was 2.54. In contrast, in those instances when the 
seller behaves honestly, only 2.04 products are negotiated (only considering those dyads that 
negotiated for at least one high quality product). This difference is statistically significant 
(ANOVA at 5.7% level).  
Table 16: Opportunism by culture (dyads) 
  Honest Cheat Total 
Same 16 48% 3 27% 19 43% 
Mixed 
Context Culture 
17 52% 8 73% 25 57% 
 Total 33 100% 11 100% 44 100% 
 
 
Table 17: Opportunism by gender 
  Honest Cheat Total 
Male 17 26% 6 27% 23 26% 
Buyer Female 16 24% 5 23% 21 24% 
Male 22 33% 8 36% 30 34% 
Seller Female 11 17% 3 14% 14 16% 
 Total 66 100% 22 100% 88 100% 
  
 Profits: In this study, expected, agreed and actual profits are recorded for both the 
individual as well as the dyadic level. Table 18 provides an overview of the complete data set. 
Individual agreed profits have an average mean of $2,406. By group, I find that buyers 
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negotiated slightly higher profits (individual agreed profits) than sellers but an ANOVA test 
shows that there is no statistically significant difference between the means. The individual 
expected profits of buyers are slightly lower than those of the sellers, $2,290.9 and $2,696.6 
respectively, a difference in means marginally significant at 10% level. This result is due to the 
set-up of the experiment providing greater control to the seller. In terms of individual actual 
profits, again buyers realized lower profits than sellers; the difference in means significant at 
the 5% level. Individual actual (same as individual expected profits) buyer profits are higher 
than agreed profits. These findings are partially driven by the set-up of the experiment as the 
seller has control over quality and this impacts to some extent profits. A comparison of buyer 
profits shows that although there appears to be a difference in individual actual profits between 
those who choose only low quality products ($1,350) and those who chose at least one high 
quality product ($2,258), this difference is not statistically significant (at the 10% level). 
Table 18: Description of profits (joint and individual) 
  Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Distribution Min. Max. 
Individual agreed profits 44 2,559.09 1,177.86 -400 4,800 
Individual expected profits 44 2,290.91 1,188.82 -500 4,600 Buyer 
Individual actual profits 44 2,154.55 1,215.64 -400 4,600 
       
Individual agreed profits 44 2,253.41 1,085.28 100 4,550 
Individual expected profits 44 2,696.59 1,061.72 700 4,550 Seller 
Individual actual profits 44 2,696.59 1,061.72 700 4,550 
       
Joint expected profits 88 4,967.05 925.12 2,450 7,000 
Joint actual profits 88 4,794.32 799.73 2,150 6,250 Total 
Joint agreed profits 88 4,792.05 768.04 3,400 6,250 
 
 Joint agreed profits amount to $4,792, statistically significantly lower than the joint 
expected profits of $4,967. Similarly, joint actual profits is statistically significantly different 
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from joint expected profits (at 5% level) but does not differ from joint agreed profits. 
 Table 20 provides an overview of pairwise correlation between the main variables. For 
the variable expected opportunistic behavior, only buyer data is available, while for 
opportunistic behavior, only seller data is used. The factor of perceived opportunism and 
opportunistic behavior only correlate 0.287. This is an indication that the two are measuring 
distinct features. The factor opportunism is relating to the willingness of the partner to 
compromise in the negotiation and to consider both negotiators’ positions. Opportunistic 
behavior refers to the seller’s choice of delivering low quality when s/he promised high quality 
products. As discussed earlier, there is real correlation between expected opportunism and 
opportunistic behavior. Some correlation is present between the factors of trust and 
opportunism (-0.534) but it is still within acceptable ranges (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 
1998). 
Table 19: Correlation table 
 I II III IV V VI 
Joint actual profits (I) 1      
Individual actual profits (II) 0.261 1     
Factor trust (III) -0.037 0.069 1    
Factor satisfaction (IV) 0.148 0.410 0.350 1   
Factor opportunism (V) 0.007 0.091 -0.534 0.265 1  
Expected opportunistic behavior (VI) -0.075 -0.009 -0.351 0.099 0.224 1 




   
 92 
3.5.2. Hypothesis Testing 
Table 20: Measurement properties 
 Loading Mean SD 
Satisfaction (CR = 0.879)    
If an agreement was reached, how satisfied are you with that agreement? 0.896 2.841 0.829 
How satisfied are you with the agreement relative to your pregame expectations? 0.858 2.659 1.049 
How satisfied are you with your individual profits? 0.851 2.625 0.938 
How satisfied are you with your performance during the game? 0.837 2.602 0.965 
    
Trust (CR = 0.935)    
* Corporation can be trusted completely. 0.902 2.557 1.173 
* Corporation can be counted on to do what is right. 0.914 2.489 1.155 
* Corporation is a company that I have great confidence in. 0.932 2.523 1.104 
* Corporation can be relied upon. 0.944 2.602 1.045 
I am willing to deal with * Corporation again. 0.707 3.023 0.947 
* Corporation keeps promises it makes. 0.776 2.609 0.998 
I believe the information * Corporation provides 0.746 2.614 1.044 
    
Perceived Opportunism (CR =  0.722)    
Rate * Corporation's bargaining strategies on the following scales:    
Accommodating to exploitive 0.820 2.568 0.980 
Honest to deceptive 0.821 2.352 1.051 
Unbiased to biased 0.765 3.011 1.000 
* refers to either Buyer or Seller depending on participant's role in the negotiation 
 
In the first hypothesis, I proposed that intercultural negotiations results in lower joint 
profits (H1a), satisfaction (H1b) and trust (H1c) while also leading to higher perceived levels of 
opportunism (H1d) and more opportunistic behavior (H1e). The level of unidimensionality of 
the factors “satisfaction”, “trust” and “perceived opportunism” are assessed by means of 
standard confirmatory factor analysis. The factor loadings, mean and standard deviation of 
each item as well as the Cronbach’s Alpha are reported in Table 20. As this study uses existing 
scales, the suggested cut-off value is 0.70 (Hair et al., 1998): it is met by all three factors. I 
tested this hypothesis using ANOVA tests – some on a sub-sample (buyer, seller) basis and 
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some on the dyad-level. Dyad-level analysis implies that factor scores for each individual are 
average across dyads (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006).  
Table 21: ANOVA joint actual profits by dyad (same vs. mixed-context culture) 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F 
Between Groups 2,464,416.39 1 2,464,416.39 4.08 0.050 
Within Groups 25,356,663.20 42 603,730.075   
Total 27,821,079.50 43 647,001.85   
R2 0.089     
Adj. R2 0.067     
Root MSE     777.001     





Table 22: Descriptives of joint profits by dyad (same vs. mixed-context culture) 
Joint Profits N Mean SD Min Max 
Same CC Team 19 5,065.79 678.039 3,850 6,250 
Mixed CC Team 25 4,588.00 843.638 2,150 5,950 
Total 44 4,794.32 804.364 2,150 6,250 
 
For Hypothesis 1a, the main dependent variable is joint profits. The output in Table 21 
shows, that at the 5% level, joint profits is significantly influenced by cultural background of 
the parties involved in the negotiation. Participants in mixed-context dyads have statistically 
significantly different outcomes than the participants with the same cultural background. Table 
22 provides an overview of the different means for both groups: overall joint profits in same-
context teams is above $5,065 while in mixed-context teams these only amount to $4,588 – 
providing support for H1a. In addition, the results reported in Table 24 provide additional 
support for this claim as they show a statistically significant negative impact of cultural 
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In H1b, I hypothesize that participants in mixed-context culture dyads are less satisfied 
with the negotiation than participants with the same cultural background. However, as reported 
in Table 23, there are no significant differences between the two groups. Similarly, I find no 
support for H1c, that mixed-context cultural teams trusted each other less than their same-
context culture counterparts. I only find partial support for H1d that mixed context culture 
dyads are expecting more opportunistic behavior from their counterparts. Using perceived 
opportunism, I find no statistically significant difference between the two groups. However, the 
measure of expected opportunistic behavior provides additional insights. Using only the buyer 
sub-sample7, I find that at the 10% level (Prob > F = 0.097), buyers are more wary in mixed-
context culture settings than in same context culture setting that their partner will behave 
opportunistically. H1e hypothesizes that sellers in mixed-context culture pairs are more likely to 
behave opportunistically. The ANOVA test provides no statistically significant support for this 
relationship. 
Table 23: ANOVA satisfaction by dyad (same vs. mixed-context culture) 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F 
Between Groups 0.2440 1 0.244 0.58 0.450 
Within Groups 17.618 42 0.419   
Total 17.862 43 0.415   
R2 0.089     
Adj. R2 0.067     
Root MSE  0.648     
Number of obs.  44     
 
The first step in dyadic relationships is the investigation of potential non-independence 
of observations (Kenny et al., 2006). The nonparametric chi-square test showed that the 
observations are not independent of each other but rather vary by dyad (as opposed to each 
                                                
7 I use only the buyers in this sub-sample as they are “expecting” a certain behavior from the seller. The seller does not expect 
a certain behavior but rather provides the actual behavior in the situation.  
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observation individually). This requires further analyses to account for the non-independence. 
Hence, rather than using a standard OLS to estimate the relationship between satisfaction, trust, 
perceived opportunism and opportunistic behavior on joint profits in the dyads, I use a fixed 
effects model with between effects for the groups (dyads) (Kenny et al., 2006). The complete 
model, as shown in the results Table 24, has a reasonably good fit (Prob > F = 0.059) 
Table 24: Between group effects model of joint actual profits and dyads (same vs. mixed-context culture)
8,9
 
Joint actual profits Coefficients Std. Err. t P>t  
Satisfaction  182.184 303.821 0.60 0.553  
Trust 734.736 502.779 1.46 0.153  
Perceived opportunism (PO) 1,103.481 498.738 2.21 0.034  
Opportunistic behavior -480.632 292.326 -1.64 0.109  
Cultural differences (CD) -431.133 229.868 -1.88 0.069 H1a 
Satisfaction*CD -171.981 401.436 -0.43 0.671 H2 
Trust*CD -1,041.630 539.279 -1.93 0.062 H3 
PO*CD -1,251.582 540.271 -2.32 0.027 H4 
Constant 5,156.667 174.736 29.51 0.000  
R2 within -     
R2 between 0.328 
R2 overall 0.190   
 
 
F(8, 35) 2.130 Prob > F 0.059   
SD                   730.951     
N of observations 88     
N of groups 44 Grouping variable: Dyad  
Observation per group 2     
 
Table 24 provides the basis for the testing of the next hypotheses. The direct effect 
between perceived satisfaction and joint profits is insignificant. H2 proposes that the 
relationship between satisfaction and joint profits is moderated by culture. Using same- versus 
                                                
8 Gender, age and time spent in the USA as a percentage of life-time do not have a significant effect on the results 
when included in the model (please refer to Appendix E). As the model looses power when they are included due 
to the limited sample size of only 44 dyads, I only report on the variable of interest. 
9 I used the Hausman test to check for potential endogeneity issues of trust, satisfaction, perceived opportunism 
and cultural differences in the model but found no statistically significant effect.  
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mixed-context culture variable to create an interaction effect with satisfaction, I find no 
statistically significant effect.  
The results in Table 24 show marginal support for a moderating effect of culture on the 
relationship between trust and joint profits (H3). Cultural differences in the dyad result in a 
lower increase in profits as trust increases as opposed to dyads with participants from the same 
cultural background. Previous studies suggested that greater perceived levels of opportunism 
are associated with lower joint profits. Although I find statistically significant results, they, 
surprisingly, indicate the reverse relationship between the two variables: greater perceived 
levels of opportunism lead to greater joint profits with the in H4 proposed moderating effect of 
culture. As hypothesized in H4, cultural differences in a dyad moderate the effect of 
opportunism on joint profits: they result in smaller increases in profits than in same-context 
dyads.  
3.6. Discussion 
 This study has three key findings. First, it provides additional insights for the growing 
field of international negotiations. Second, it looks at the effects of culture as a moderator on 
the relationship between satisfaction, trust and opportunism on profits. Third, it investigates the 
relationship between perceived opportunism and opportunistic behavior in an experimental 
setting. Overall, I find that culture is an important factor to consider when dealing in an 
international context in line with previous studies in the field of negotiations. The unique 
setting of perceived and actual opportunistic behavior provides new and interesting insights 
both into negotiation behavior, in general, as well as negotiating internationally that firms and 
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their managers can use to achieve a competitive edge.  
 This research provides support for the impact of culture in cross-culture negotiations 
(Brett, 2007). As one of only a handful of studies, it investigates mixed culture dyads and 
compares them to same culture dyads. The initial hypothesis addressed the effect of same- 
versus mixed-context culture on both negotiation factors (satisfaction, trust, perceived 
opportunism and expected opportunistic behavior) as well as negotiation outcomes (profits and 
actual opportunistic behavior). I find that cultural difference have a statistically significant 
effect on the level of joint profits negotiated (H1a). Additional support for this result can be 
found when looking at individual profits as the dependent variable in the regression (Table 25). 
Profits are lower in mixed-context culture teams than in dyads with the same cultural 
background. Participants in the experiment on some level are not as engaged in finding a better 
solution when negotiating with someone from another cultural background. There are three 
potential explanations for this. First, the participants may be reluctant to provide the required 
additional information to someone they perceive as different. Due to the nature of the 
experiment, this translates into lower profits. Second, participants might not want to threaten 
the other negotiator by being a tough bargaining if s/he is from a different cultural background. 
The underlying assumption in the second setting is that the partner coming from a different 
cultural background does not understand the full implications of the negotiation behavior as 
someone from the same cultural background. Third, someone from the same cultural 
background is likely to understand the negotiation behavior with its expected intricacies better 
than someone with a different background (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999). The arising 
uncertainties from negotiating in mixed-context culture dyads can lead to being faced with 
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different approaches translating into lost opportunities and missed profits. In either of the just 
described cases, cultural differences between participants originating from different 
background results in lower financial performance, supporting the findings of previous studies 
that similarities between negotiation partners lead to greater profits (Brett & Okumura, 1998). 
 The results also show that satisfaction (H1b), trust (H1c) and perceived opportunism (H1d) 
levels are not impacted by the cultural context of the dyad. Mixed-context culture teams do not 
statistically differ significantly from same-context culture dyads. Although pervious studies 
have argued that cultural similarities increase the likelihood of reaching a satisfying conclusion 
in negotiations (Geringer et al., 1991), I do not find support for this hypothesis. The reason for 
the insignificant results may be attributed to the limited sample size of just 44 dyads – 
providing too few observations for significant findings for this relationship. Similarly, previous 
research argues that trust is based in part on cultural similarities between partners (Rinehart et 
al., 2004). Cultural differences require additional time investments to gather more information 
about the partner to assess their trustworthiness (Geyskens et al., 1999). Surprisingly, I do not 
find significant differences in the perception of trust between same- versus mixed-context 
cultures. In terms of perceived levels of opportunism, the degree to which one participants 
judges his/her partner’s willingness to compromise versus behaving solely for his/her self-
interest, is also not impacted by the context of the dyad. I expected that due to the increased 
complexity and uncertainty of culturally diverse dyads (Mintu-Wimsatt et al., 2000), overall 
levels of perceived opportunism are higher. However, participants’ assessments of the partner’s 
willingness to engage in the relationship do not appear to be impacted by the cultural 
composition of the teams.   
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 Nevertheless, buyers expect partners from a different cultural background to behave 
opportunistically more often than partners from the same cultural background (H1d). This 
implies that, to some extent, participants are influenced in their expectations and decisions by 
the cultural background of their partner. Surprisingly, although this expectation of cheating is 
present more often in mixed- than same-context culture dyads, the study does not show such an 
effect in actual opportunistic behavior (H1e). This implies that although people are inclined to 
project that someone from a different background is more likely to act opportunistically, 
people do not actually behave according to this scheme. I presume the expectation of cheating 
is due to the inherent suspicion most people have towards the unfamiliar and unknown, but 
participants, when faced with the choice, base their opportunistic behavior on factors other than 
cultural difference.   
Table 25: Between group effects model of individual actual profits and dyads (same vs. mixed-context 
culture) 
Individual actual profits Coefficients Std. Err. t P>t 
Satisfaction  80.204 123.009 0.65 0.519 
Trust 385.426 203.562  1.89 0.067 
Perceived opportunism (PO) 512.538 201.925 2.54 0.016 
Opportunistic behavior -101.404 118.355 -0.86 0.397 
Cultural differences (CD) -194.035 93.067 -2.08 0.044 
Satisfaction*CD 174.164 162.530 1.07 0.291 
Trust*CD -563.695 218.339 -2.58 0.014 
PO*CD -620.963 218.741 -2.84 0.007 
Constant 2557.382 70.746 36.15 0.000 
R-square within 0.057    
R-square between 0.408    
R-square overall 0.087    
F(8, 35) 3.01 Prob > F 0.011  
SD     295.942    
N of obs. 88    
N of groups 44 grouping variable Dyad 
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 Second, the role of culture as a moderator is considered. I investigated the relationship of 
satisfaction, trust, perceived opportunism, and opportunistic behavior on joint profits and the 
moderating effect of culture on them. Although a previous study found significant results in the 
context of joint ventures (Geringer et al., 1991), the results of this research show no 
statistically significant impact of cultural differences in the bargaining dyads on the 
relationship between satisfaction and joint profits (H2). Furthermore, the positive association of 
trust and joint profits is only marginally significant when using 90% confidence interval: 
greater trust implying great joint profits when controlling for a moderating effect of cultural 
difference in the relationship. Table 25, a robustness check shows that in the case of individual 
profits rather than joint profits as dependent variable, the relationship between trust and 
individual profits is statistically significant. In both regressions (Table 24 and 25), the negative 
interaction term between cultural difference and trust is statistically significant (H3). Culture is 
moderating the relationship between the dependent variable and trust, indicating that in mixed-
context cultures the slope of the association of trust and joint profits is less pronounced than in 
same-context cultures. Differences in cultural background are likely to introduce uncertainty 
into the relationship that translates into a less immediate trust building. The general notion that 
greater trust results in greater financial performance is moderated by culture, thereby, to some 
extent, overriding the direct effect (Langerak, 2001). Keppel and Wickens (2004) suggest that 
the interaction effect is, in such situations, a more accurate depiction of the relationship. The 
current study underscores the need for a better understanding of culture in the context of trust 
(Curall & Inkpen, 2002). The support for hypothesis H3 highlights the need for buyers and 
sellers in international relationships to be aware of the impact of cultural differences as it can 
impact their financial results. Firms can achieve a potential competitive advantage and impact 
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their long-term outlook as a business by being proactive. Recognizing the potentially 
detrimental effect of cultural differences on their financial performance in a negotiation allows 
these participants to address the issues by, for example, using negotiators more familiar with 
the partner’s cultural background. 
 Surprisingly, perceived opportunism, the degree to which one negotiator judges his/her 
partner willingness to engage in a mutual beneficial outcomes and respond to the former’s 
interest, leads to higher joint profits while previous research indicated lower profits (Lee et al. 
2006). There is one plausible explanation: the less accommodating the partner appears, the 
greater the need to discuss alternative options, thereby, opening up the opportunity to discover 
potentially greater joint profits (due to the asymmetric profits schemes of buyer and seller). 
This finding implies that perceived opportunism is not necessarily detrimental to a relationship 
but rather provides a healthy atmosphere for mutually beneficial negotiations. I do find support 
for the hypothesis that participants’ cultural background moderates the relationship between 
perceived opportunism and joint profits (H4). Although perceived opportunism leads to greater 
joint profits in general, the increase in profits is less pronounced in mixed-context culture 
dyads than in negotiations with partners from similar cultural backgrounds. Cultural 
differences, hence, reduce the beneficial impact of perceived opportunism on the performance 
outcome as participants appear to engage less in finding a better deal and more inclined to 
attribute some of the perceived level of opportunism on the fact of (cultural) differences in the 
relationship. Buyers and sellers in international relationships who are aware of this potentially 
detrimental effect can take actions. Being proactive and aware of the situation, they can 
counter the potential complacency arising from the cultural differences by using negotiators 
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familiar with the partner’s cultural background. This can provide them with a competitive 
advantage.  
 The third major finding relates to the option of delivering a product of lower than agreed 
upon quality. I want to briefly discuss the implication of opportunistic behavior. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to actually model information asymmetry in this fashion that 
allows some of the participants (the sellers) to use the given information to their advantage. 
Although perceived opportunism has been studied in the field of transaction cost economics 
(David & Han, 2004; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997), actual opportunistic behavior is difficult to 
observe. Using an experimental study allows the researcher to measure actual opportunistic 
behavior, expected opportunistic behavior and perceived opportunism and compare the 
findings. Using the argument of individual rationality (Smith, 1991), one expects buyers in the 
current set-up to choose low quality products as this provides them with the same level of 
information as the seller, eliminating any potential information asymmetry in the relationship 
and the opportunity for the seller to behave opportunistically. However, I find that the majority 
of dyads choose at least one high quality product in their negotiation.  
 Choosing only low quality products appears to be the rational choice for the buyer in the 
current experiment as it eliminates the information asymmetry in the relationship due to the 
seller’s superior knowledge of the quality level of the product. However, as seller, participants 
are more inclined to negotiate high quality products as it provides them with the opportunity to 
deliver low quality and, thereby, generate higher individual profits. Surprisingly though, I find 
that not only do the majority of dyads choose to negotiate the sale of at least one high quality 
product, but also, the majority of sellers chooses not to cheat. I find significant results that a 
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greater number of high quality products negotiated increases the likelihood of the seller to 
default and deliver low quality. The incentive to cheat is greater as a greater number of high 
quality products imply greater individual profits for the seller (if s/he cheats).  
 I looked closer at the underlying dynamics of hypothesis H1a and I find that cultural 
difference has a statistically significant effect on the level of joint profits negotiated. In pairs 
with negotiators from the same cultural background, these profits are higher than in mixed-
context culture dyads. When investigating this relationship in more depth using sub-samples of 
the buyer and seller and their individual profits, only the buyer’s side is of importance. The 
ANOVA results reported in Table 26 and Table 27 show that there is significantly different 
individual profits on the buyer side, while sellers’ individual profits are unaffected by culture 
of their partner. This suggests that the information asymmetry appears to interact with cultural 
difference. The seller who has more complete information in the negotiation is not influenced 
in his/her profits due to the buyer’s cultural background. The buyer, however, when faced with 
the uncertainty of not knowing the outcome of the negotiation, negotiates prices more carefully 
with a partner from a different cultural background than with someone from the same 
background. This supports earlier reasoning that similar cultural backgrounds provide better 
grounds for mutual assessment.  
Table 26: ANOVA individual actual profits by dyad (mixed vs. same-context culture) for buyer 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F 
Between Groups 5655427.75 1 5655427.75 4.1 0.049 
Within Groups 57888663.20 42 1378301.50   
Total 63544090.90 43 1477769.56   
R2 0.089     
Adj. R2 0.067     
Root MSE     1174.01     
Number of obs.  44     
  
  





Table 27: ANOVA individual actual profits by dyad (mixed vs. same-context culture) for seller 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F 
Between Groups 1292388.64 1 1292388.64 1.15 0.290 
Within Groups 47179600.00 42 1123323.81   
Total 48471988.60 43 1127255.55   
R2 0.027     
Adj. R2 0.004     
Root MSE     1059.87     
N 44     
 
3.6.1 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
One potential limitation of the current study is its sample size of only 44 dyads. This 
might increase the potential for Type II errors in the study. For future publication of this essay, 
additional information will be gathered from the part-time MBA program here at Maryland. 
The set-up of the experiment makes the administration in a classroom possible and as such 
allows the experimenter to collect a greater number of observations in a limited time. In 
addition, the number of issues addressed in the experiment (global negotiation, buyer-seller 
interaction, information asymmetry, opportunistic behavior) provides a broad base for 
integration of the experiment into the class schedule in the field of supply chain management. 
Greater sample size will also allow me to distinguish not only between same versus mixed 
context cultures but also within the same context culture groups: low-low versus high-high.  
In addition, future research should consider the length of relationship between 
participants. Although the study attempted to separate friends from each other, the majority of 
participants in the study knew each other for at least nine months. Future experiments can ask 
in the follow up question how long the subjects have know each other. Alternatively, data from 
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participants who just met can be used as a control group and the two groups can be compared. 
If no difference in means between these groups is present, I can conclude that participants 
lengths of previous relationship with their partner has no effect (or alternatively, has an effect) 
on the negotiation behavior and outcomes. 
The experiment provides a new base for researchers in the field of negotiation to further 
investigate the impact of information asymmetry on negotiation behavior and outcomes. Again, 
the simple set-up of the experiment that allows the collection of multiple observations 
simultaneously is of great advantage.  
3.7 Conclusion 
 Cultural differences impact human interaction in various ways. This study and its 
findings underscore and emphasize the need in global supply chains to be aware of the 
potential issues and opportunities that can arise due to cultural differences. Culture has both 
direct and indirect effects in negotiations. I find that it directly influences dyads’ joint profit 
levels. In addition, this serves as a moderator that reduces the strength of the relationship 
between trust and joint profits. Unexpectedly, the results showed that perceived opportunism 
increases joint profits: participants’ perception of their partners’ willingness to negotiate in a 
reciprocrative manner does not lead to greater profits. Rather, the perceived unwillingness to 
give an inch resulted in more in-depth discussion and exploration of opportunities ultimately 
leading to higher profits.  
In addition, the study provided unique insights into the setting of information 
asymmetry in a business negotiation environment – a situation buyers and sellers in real-life 
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face frequently. Unexpectedly, I find that participants do not follow the rational choice but that 
an inherent level of trust is present in these negotiations. Not only do buyers make themselves 
vulnerable by choosing high quality products, but also the majority of sellers actually followed 
through on their promises and forewent profits in favor of honest behavior. However, along 
this study’s expectations, the results do show that cultural differences impact the perception 
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Chapter 4: Summary and Conclusion 
4.1 Summary 
In this dissertation, I investigated the impact of culture in international buyer-supplier 
relationships from two distinct viewpoints (the written and the spoken negotiation) and two 
methodologies (an archival data and a behavioral experimental study). Although there has been 
an increase in the number of studies in recent years that looked at intercultural issues, the 
impact of cultural differences in buyer seller relationship is not well understood (Kaufmann & 
Carter, 2006). In times of increasing numbers of global supply chains, a better grasp on the 
effects of cultural differences can provide businesses with opportunities for cost savings as 
well as competitive advantages. Therefore, I addressed the following research questions in this 
dissertation: 
What is the effect of differences in the cultural background of buyer and supplier on 
their contractual relations? 
and 
How does cultural distance effect international negotiations?  
What is the moderating effect of cultural differences on negotiations? 
Both studies use the framework of transaction cost economics (TCE) as theoretic lens. 
Williamson (1979) proposed that uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency influence the 
decision to source from the market or produce in-house under assumption of bounded 
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rationality of parties involved and the resulting potential for opportunism. In the following 
decades, the theory has been applied to various studies in field of strategic management and 
industrial organizational economics (Geyskens et al., 2006; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). In the 
first study, I argue that the dimension of uncertainty can be operationalized using cultural 
differences. In the second study, the issue of culture and opportunism is looked at in more 
detail. In both studies, two sets of hypotheses are derived that relate and investigate cultural 
difference to outcomes in buyer-supplier relationships. 
 The second chapter details the effect of culture in contractual buyer supplier agreements 
using archival data. A large number of relationships translate into contracts between partners, 
but very few studies have investigated the effect of cultural differences on these written 
agreements. Contracts are adjusted based on the needs and requirements of specific partners in 
the relationship. The current study took contractual data from a European multinational 
company and investigated the impact of culture on buyer-supplier relationships using 
Hofstede’s four culture dimensions: power distance, masculinity, individuality and uncertainty 
avoidance. The main finding was that contract completeness increases as the cultural gap 
between the buyer and supplier widens. The results for individual culture dimensions on 
contract completeness, measured per buyer-supplier pair, were mixed. With regard to contract 
length, only average masculinity scores had a positive effect on it, while the other culture 
dimensions and the measure of cultural distance were insignificant. Cultural distance impacted 
the option of renegotiation but the individual dimensions failed to have any effect. Finally, 
asset specificity had the expected positive effect on the level of contract completeness and the 
option to renegotiate, while more frequent transactions result in lower levels of contract 
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completeness, shorter contracts and fewer options to renegotiate.  
 The third chapter investigated the impact of cultural differences in the context of dyadic 
buyer-supplier relationships. More specifically, the study focused on the effect of culture and 
cultural differences in negotiation. It also addressed the issue of culture as a moderating 
variable. The study used an experimental design to investigate these issues. In the simulation 
negotiation, participants, classified by their country of origin, are asked to take on the role of 
either buyer or supplier. They negotiate prices and quality levels for three products. This study 
found that cultural differences within the negotiation dyad reduced joint profits when 
compared to those participants in same cultural background dyads. I observed that cultural 
differences weaken the effect of trust and opportunism on joint profits. Overall, this study 
concluded that cultural differences as encountered in day-to-day business interactions in global 
supply chains impose greater challenges compared to partners from the same cultural 
background.  
4.2 Conclusion 
  Overall, both studies conclude that culture and cultural differences have a significant 
effect on intercultural buyer-supplier relationship. Businesses can gain significant advantages 
when understanding these effects and, hence, should be both aware of cultural differences as 
well as take active steps to influence these differences to their advantage. The first step to 
recognize the effect of culture: this can already change the attitude and behavior of participants 
involved. Second, especially in case of negotiations, firms engaged in these settings can 
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potentially counter some of the negative effects by using negotiators from a similar cultural 
background.  
In addition, this dissertation research refines and enhances the understanding of 
transaction cost economics from the angle of cultural differences. The studies further explore 
the different dimensions of transaction cost economics. The first study provides additional 
support for Williamson’s proposed relationships between uncertainty, asset specificity and 
frequency on transaction costs. In addition, the research investigated different measures of 
transaction cost. These findings can be use to guide future research in the field of TCE. The 
second study provides insights into the dynamics between perceived opportunism and actual 
opportunistic behavior. To my knowledge, this relationship has not been investigated in the 
field of buyer-supplier relationships before, although it is realistic depiction of the real world.  
4.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
Overall, the research demonstrated that the field of intercultural buyer-supplier 
relationships is in need of further investigation. Although research in the past two decades has 
grown tremendously, the impact of culture and cultural differences in day-to-day buyer 
supplier interaction is not well understood. The current study provides some suggestions of 
how to approach the issue. 
The first study raises additional questions with regard to which specific contract terms 
are included in more culturally different relationships than in contracts between culturally 
similar partners. Future research – using the same data set – can investigate more closely which 
dimensions of a contract are used in different cultural pairings. Especially, a further analysis of 
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sub-sets of the data (e.g. by product categories) allows for the comparison of seemingly similar 
contracts.  
With regard to the second study, few studies have looked at mixed-context cultures. As 
global supply chain interactions take place between partners from different countries, these are 
the kind of relationships that need to be investigated in detail. The previous focus on 
comparison of dyads from different countries provides initial insights but does not address 
most of the issues faced by buyers and suppliers in today’s global economy. Hence, the next 
step is to look at mixed-context culture dyads in a more nuanced fashion than the current study 
does by investigating difference between dyads for e.g. US-China versus US-India versus US-
Spain. It is likely that different mixed-culture dyads emphasize different aspects in 
negotiations.  
In addition, future research should focus on the distinction of perceived, expected and 
actual opportunism. The current research provides a stepping-stone to investigate various 
aspects of information asymmetry in buyer-supplier relationships. In this context, culture could 
be investigated in more detail. Differences in dyads can be looked at more closely. For 
example, does it matter whether the high or the low context culture participant has a 
competitive advantage due to the information asymmetry? 
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Appendix A – Experiment Buyer  
Buyer Information - Case 
You are a member of the purchasing team for Buyer Corporation, a company that produces 
computers and technical equipment. Your company has done quite well in the last two 
quarters. Because of this, you are quite confident about your firm’s long terms prospects.  
Your company is currently developing a new product. For this new product, you, as buyer for 
Buyer Corporation, need to source three components. You would like to find a supplier for the 
three components as to get the new product well and fast on its way. In addition, it would help 
with your performance review and purchase commission. You currently earn commission on 
the profit Buyer Corporation makes on each of the purchases you negotiated, with the amount 
varying as a function of the particular component and profits achieved for the firm.  
Generally, Buyer Corporation sources from suppliers around the world. Seller Corporation is 
one of a few suppliers that have pre-qualified for actual negotiations for the three components 
and you have contacted them to enter into negotiations about the sale of the three components 
for the new product. Your goal is to negotiate some or, preferably, all of this business. 
Buyer Corporation demands: 
- 1,000,000 units of Alpha components to be delivered over the next 3 months.  
- 1,000,000 units of Beta components to be delivered over the next 3 months.  
- 1,000,000 units of Gamma components to be delivered over the next 3 months.  
The specifications for all three components are familiar to Seller Corporation, and their firm’s 
engineers have held discussions with your company’s engineers about how these components 
can be manufactured for a new product that your firm has under development. Seller 
Corporation’s engineers forecast no difficulty in meeting Buyer Corporation’s demand. 
Seller Corporation has the option of supplying each component at a low or high quality level. 
The higher quality component is significantly more expensive to produce and, hence, the pay-
off tables between high and low quality components differ. Overall, better quality will reflect 
itself over time in terms of profits due to a better brand image. 
This quality difference is not observable upon inspection by your firm. This implies that your 
company has no means to control the level of quality of the component upon receipt. You are 
required to accept the product delivered without being able to enforce the level of quality 
agreed upon during negotiations. However, the actual quality delivered will reflect upon the 
profits and commissions you as well as your negotiation partner will receive.  
The follow table shows how changing prices for each quality level and each product impact 
your firm’s profits. Prices are displayed as letters (A-N). Each letter is equivalent to a certain 
profit (loss) for you as well as Seller Corporation. You may negotiate any letter price that you 
think will help you negotiate a successful contract with Seller Corporation. Bear in mind, 
however, that you will earn negative commission on all negative profit sales you made.  
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What quality level (hi = high) or lo = low) and price did you negotiate? 
  
_______________ Alpha  ___________________ Beta   _________________ Gamma 
 
What time did you finish the negotiation? 
 
____________
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Survey  
Instructions:  Please answer the questions as honestly as possible. Although some of the 
questions may seem similar, it is important to answer all of them. Remember, there are no 
right or wrong answers and all information you provide will remain strictly confidential. 
Thank you for your help! 
1.What level of quality do you think Seller Corporation ended up delivering? (hi = high quality, 
lo = low quality) 
_____ Alpha  _____ Beta   ______ Gamma 
                                        Dissa- 
Satisfied                tisfied 
        1   2   3   4    5 
2. If an agreement was reached, how satisfied were      
you with that agreement?       
3. How satisfied are you with the agreement relative      
to your pregame expectations?     
4. How satisfied were you with your individual profits?      
5. How satisfied were you with your performance      
during the game?       
               Mutual    Self-  
              problem             interest 
         1   2   3   4   5 
6. Were you more interested in solving your mutual      
problem or more self-interested?   
    Completely        Completely 
agree           disagree 
        1   2   3   4    5 
7. Seller Corporation can be trusted completely.       
8. Seller Corporation can be counted on to do what is      
right.  
9. Seller Corporation is a company that I have great      
confidence in. 
10. Seller Corporation can be relied upon.       
11. I am willing to deal with Seller Corporation again.      
12. Seller Corporation keeps promises it makes.       
13. Seller Corporation is not always honest with you.      
14. I believe the info Seller Corporation provides.      
15. I find it necessary to be cautious when dealing with      
Seller Corporation. 
16. Seller Corporation is genuinely concerned that my      
company succeeds. 
17. I trust that Seller Corporation keeps my firm’s best      
interest in mind. 
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Rate your own bargaining strategies on the following scales: 
         1             2       3            4                5   
18. Accommodating      Exploitive 
19. Honest 
     
Deceptive 
20. Unbiased 
     
Biased 
 
Rate Seller Corporation’s bargaining strategies on the following scales: 
         1             2       3            4                  5  
21. Accommodating      Exploitive 
22. Honest 
     
Deceptive 
23. Unbiased 
     
Biased 
Completely      Completely      
agree           disagree 
        1   2   3   4    5 
24. Group welfare is more important than individual       
rewards. 
25. Managers should make most decisions without       
consulting subordinates. 
26. It is important to have job requirements and inst-      
ructions spelled out in detail so that employees always  
know what they are expected to do. 
27. Meetings are usually run more effectively when      
they are chaired by a man.  
28. Group success is more important than individual       
success. 
29. It is frequently necessary for a manager to use       
authority and power when dealing with subordinates. 
30. Managers expect employees to closely follow        
instructions and procedures. 
31. It is more important for men to have a professional      
career than it is for women. 
32. Being accepted by members of your work group is      
very important. 
33. Managers should seldom ask for the opinions of        
employees. 
34. Rules and regulations are important because they        
inform employees what the organization expects of them. 
35. Men usually solve problems with logical analysis;      
women usually solve problems with intuition.  
36. Employees should only pursue their goals after      
considering the welfare of the group. 
37. Managers should avoid off-the-job social contact      
with employees.
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             Completely                    Completely 
             agree           disagree 
        1   2   3   4    5 
38. Standard operating procedures are helpful to       
employees on the job. 
39. Solving organizational problems usually requires       
an active forcible approach which is typical of men. 
40. Managers should encourage group loyalty even       
if individual goals suffer.  
41. Employees should not disagree with management       
decisions. 
42. Standard operating procedures are important for        
employees on the job. 
43. It is preferable to have a man in a high level       
position rather than a woman. 
44. Individuals may be expected to give up their goals       
in order to benefit group success. 




45. Are you (please circle one):  (a) Female  (b) Male 
46. Are you (please circle one):  (a) U.S. citizen (b) Not a U.S. citizen  
47. What was your nationality at birth: ________________  
48. If you live part of your life outside of the USA, please specify:  
Where:  ________________________________________ 
How long:  ________________________________________ 
49. Year of birth: _________ 
50. Was either of your parents born outside of the USA? (please circle one)  
 (a) No, both parents were born in the USA 
(b) Yes, one parent in __________________ 
 (c) Yes, both parents in ________________________________________ 
51. Previous work experience in years: ______________ 
52. Title of your last job: _____________________________________________ 
53. Ethnic Background (please circle one):  (a) African American/Black 
      (b) American Indian  
      (c) Asian/Pacific Islander 
      (d) Caucasian/White 
      (e) Latino/Hispanic 
      (f) Other: _________________
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Appendix B – Experiment Supplier 
Seller Information – Case 
You are a member of the account team for Seller Corporation, which supplies high tech 
components to computer and technical equipment manufacturers. Your company, 
however, has done quite well in the last two quarters. Because of this, you are quite 
confident about your firm’s long terms prospects. You, personally, would like to win 
more sales, as it would help with your performance review and sales commission. You 
currently earn commission on the profit you make on each sale, with the amount varying 
as a function of the particular product and profits achieved for the firm. 
One of your customers, Buyer Corporation, has contacted you to enter into negotiations 
about the sales contract of three components for a new product of theirs. Your goal is to 
negotiate some or, preferably, all of this business. You are one of a few suppliers that 
have been pre-qualified for actual negotiations for the components.  
Buyer Corporation Demands: 
1,000,000 units of Alpha components to be delivered over the next 3 months.  
1,000,000 units of Beta components to be delivered over the next 3 months.  
1,000,000 units of Gamma components to be delivered over the next 3 months.  
The specifications for all three components are familiar to your firm, and your firm’s 
engineers have held discussions with people at Buyer Corporation about how these 
components can be manufactured for a new product that Buyer Corporation has under 
development. Your company engineers forecast no difficulty in meeting Buyer 
Corporation’s demand. 
You have the option of supplying each component at a low or high quality level to 
Buyer Corporation. The higher quality component is significantly more expensive to 
produce and, hence, the pay-off tables between high and low quality components differ. 
Overall, better quality will reflect itself over time in terms of profits due to a better brand 
image of Buyer Corporation. 
This quality difference is not observable upon inspection by Buyer Corporation. This 
implies that Buyer Corporation has no means to control the level of quality of the 
component. They will have to accept the product delivered without being able to enforce 
the level of quality agreed upon during negotiation. However, the actual quality delivered 
will reflect the profits and commissions you and your negotiation partner will receive. 
The follow table shows how changing prices for each quality level and each product 
impact your firm’s profits. Prices are displayed as letters (A-N). Each letter corresponds 
to a certain profit (loss) for you as well as Buyer corporation. You may negotiate any 
letter price that you think will help you negotiate a successful contract with Buyer 
Corporation. Bear in mind, however, that you will earn negative commission on all 
negative profit sales you made.
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What quality level (hi = high) or lo = low) and price did you negotiate? 
 
_______________ Alpha  ___________________ Beta   _________________ Gamma 
 
What time did you finish the negotiation? 
 
__________ 
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Survey  
Instructions:  Please answer the questions as honestly as possible. Although some of the 
questions may seem similar, it is important to answer all of them. Remember, there are no right 
or wrong answers and all information you provide will remain strictly confidential. Thank you 
for your help! 
1.What level of quality do you intend to deliver to Buyer Corporation? (hi = high quality, lo = 
low quality) 
_____ Alpha  _____ Beta   ______ Gamma       
                                  Dissa- 
      Satisfied              tisfied 
        1   2   3   4    5 
2. If an agreement was reached, how satisfied were      
you with that agreement?       
3. How satisfied are you with the agreement relative      
to your pregame expectations?     
4. How satisfied were you with your individual profits?      
5. How satisfied were you with your performance      
during the game?       
       Mutual                 Self-  
       problem                          interest 
         1   2   3   4   5 
6. Were you more interested in solving your mutual      
problem or more self-interested?   
Completely                   Completely 
 agree                             disagree 
         1   2   3   4    5 
7. Buyer Corporation can be trusted completely.       
8. Buyer Corporation can be counted on to do what      
is right. 
9. Buyer Corporation is a company that I have great      
confidence in. 
10. Buyer Corporation can be relied upon.       
11. I am willing to deal with Buyer Corporation again.      
12. Buyer Corporation keeps promises it makes.       
13. Buyer Corporation is not always honest with you.      
14. I believe the information Buyer Corporation provides.      
15. I find it necessary to be cautious when dealing with      
Buyer Corporation. 
16. Buyer Corporation is genuinely concerned that my      
company succeeds. 
17. I trust that Buyer Corporation keeps my firm’s best      
interest in mind. 
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Rate your own bargaining strategies on the following scales: 
          1              2        3             4                 5   
18. Accommodating      Exploitive 
19. Honest 
     
Deceptive 
20. Unbiased 
     
Biased 
Rate Buyer Corporation’s bargaining strategies on the following scales: 
          1              2       3             4                 5  
21. Accommodating      Exploitive 
22. Honest 
     
Deceptive 
23. Unbiased 
     
Biased 
Completely        Completely 
agree                   disagree 
        1   2   3   4    5 
24. Group welfare is more important than individual       
rewards. 
25. Managers should make most decisions without       
consulting subordinates. 
26. It is important to have job requirements and ins-      
tructions spelled out in detail so that employees  
always know what they are expected to do. 
27. Meetings are usually run more effectively when      
they are chaired by a man.  
28. Group success is more important than individual       
success. 
29. It is frequently necessary for a manager to use       
authority and power when dealing with subordinates. 
30. Managers expect employees to closely follow        
instructions and procedures. 
31. It is more important for men to have a professional      
career than it is for women. 
32. Being accepted by members of your work group is       
very important. 
33. Managers should seldom ask for the opinions of        
employees. 
34. Rules and regulations are important because they        
inform employees what the organization expects of them. 
35. Men usually solve problems with logical analysis;      
women usually solve problems with intuition.  
36. Employees should only pursue their goals after      
considering the welfare of the group. 
37. Managers should avoid off-the-job social contact       
with employees. 
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     Completely                    Completely 
         agree                          disagree 
        1   2   3   4    5 
38. Standard operating procedures are helpful to         
employees on the job. 
39. Solving organizational problems usually requires       
an active forcible approach which is typical of men. 
40. Managers should encourage group loyalty even       
if individual goals suffer.  
41. Employees should not disagree with management       
decisions. 
42. Standard operating procedures are important for        
employees on the job. 
43. It is preferable to have a man in a high level position       
rather than a woman. 
44. Individuals may be expected to give up their goals       
in order to benefit group success. 




45. Are you (please circle one):  (a) Female  (b) Male 
46. Are you (please circle one):  (a) U.S. citizen (b) Not a U.S. citizen  
47. What was your nationality at birth: ________________  
48. If you live part of your life outside of the USA, please specify:  
Where:  ________________________________________ 
How long:  ________________________________________ 
49. Year of birth: _________ 
50. Was either of your parents born outside of the USA? (please circle one)  
 (a) No, both parents were born in the USA 
(b) Yes, one parent in __________________ 
 (c) Yes, both parents in ________________________________________ 
51. Previous work experience in years: ______________ 
52. Title of your last job: _____________________________________________ 
53. Ethnic Background (please circle one):  (a) African American/Black 
      (b) American Indian  
      (c) Asian/Pacific Islander 
      (d) Caucasian/White 
      (e) Latino/Hispanic 
      (f) Other: ____________ 
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Appendix C – Email Invitation to Participate in Experiment 
Dear … student, 
I am hereby inviting you to take part in my dissertation research during a Pizza luncheon 
on DAY, DATE, 2010 at TIME in room XXX. If you can make it, please RSVP by 
DAY-1 morning (even maybes) so I know how much Pizza to order. 
The experiment will take about 30 minutes. I am investigating negotiation behavior of 
managers and their outcomes. This is part of my dissertation and I greatly appreciate your 
help. I invite you as you are part of the student body in the business school. 
Results from this study will be used to help with the current ongoing research in field of 
buyer-supplier negotiations. Better understanding of these processes will allow us to 
provide guidelines for such settings. 
Your answers are completely confidential and will be released only as summaries in 
which no individual’s answers can be indentified. Once the negotiation game is 
completed, any contact information you have provided will be deleted and never 
connected with your answers in any way. The participation in this negotiation game is 
voluntary. However, you can help very much by taking half an hour to share your 
experiences by participating. If you are interested in additional information, please 
contact me at dribbink@rhsmith.umd.edu. 
Sincerely, 
Dina Ribbink 
BTW: For those of you who already took part, I am sorry to inform you that you are not 
eligible for a second try.  
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Thank you for your help in this study that investigates negotiation behavior of managers 
and their outcomes. This is part of my dissertation and I greatly appreciate your help. I 
invited you as you are a student in the business school and train to be a manager in the 
future. 
Results from this study will be used to help with the current ongoing research in field of 
buyer-supplier negotiations. Better understanding of these processes will allow us to 
provide guidelines for such settings.  
You will be asked to assume the role of either Buyer or Supplier and negotiate the sale of 
three goods in assigned pairs. All needed information is provided to you in the hand-outs. 
You will have about 10 minutes to read the instructions. Please negotiate the deal to the 
best of your abilities and record your answers on the sheets provided. Once you reach an 
agreement, you will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire. Please keep in mind there 
are no right or wrong answer.  
If you would like to participate in the chance to win one of several gift cards (prizes) 
based on your performance in the negotiation game, please fill out your name in the sheet 
up front.  
Thank you for taking the time to participate and help me out with my dissertation.  
 
    
   
  124 
 
 
Appendix E – Extended between group effects model 
 
Appendix Table 1: Extended between group effects model of joint actual profits and dyads (same vs. 
mixed-context culture) 
Joint actual profits Coefficients Std. Err. t P>t 
Satisfaction  264.086 307.314 -0.86 0.396 
Trust 644.754 507.283 -1.27 0.213 
Perceived opportunism (PO) 1003.562 496.222 2.02 0.051 
Opportunistic behavior -461.920 300.830 -1.54 0.134 
Cultural differences (CD) -473.107 241.653 -1.96 0.059 
gender -241.028 305.626 -0.79 0.436 
Time in US (as % of life) -85.504 478.177 -0.18 0.859 
Satisfaction*CD 945.439 546.000 1.73 0.093 
Trust*CD -110.027 407.405 -0.27 0.789 
PO*CD -1162.701 539.315 -2.16 0.038 
Constant 5395.203 479.028 11.26 0.000 
R
2 
within  -     
R
2 
between 0.330    
R
2 
overall 0.2102    
F(8, 35) 1.62 Prob > F 0.143  
SD                   751.612 grouping variable dyad  
N of observations 87 min 1  
N of groups 44 avg 2  
Observation per group 2 max 2  
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